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Exacted Conservation Easements: The Hard
Case of Endangered Species Protection
Many federal and state environmental laws require permits for
development projects. Permit applicants must often show that
they will mitigate the harm caused by their projects. The Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) is one of those statutes. For developers
to carry out projects that may harm threatened and endangered
species, they must obtain Incidental Take Permits. As part of
that permitting process, applicants prepare Habitat Conservation
Plans (HCPs). One of the key elements of any HCP is mitigation
of the potential harms of the development project. Often mitiga-
tion measures take the form of land preservation by either
purchasing and conserving endangered species habitat or creat-
ing or purchasing conservation easements for such habitat. The
use of conservation easements in conjunction with the ESA
raises a host of concerns for environmentalists, developers, and
regulatory agencies. This Article describes the use of conserva-
tion easements in the HCP process and explains the complexities
that arise with the enforcement of those conservation easements.
When landowners comply with the conditions of HCPs and con-
servation easements, all works well. However, when an owner of
land burdened by a conservation easement does not comply with
the conservation easement, enforcement becomes an issue. Typi-
cally, the holder of the conservation easement enforces the
agreement. When a conservation easement holder is not diligent,
however, it is unclear who can enforce the terms of the agree-
ment. This becomes a concern of the public in conjunction with
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the ESA. HCP conservation easements are held by many differ-
ent groups with different levels of capability and interest in en-
forcement. Because these conservation easements are held in
perpetuity, it is important that the fate of endangered species rest
in capable hands. To ensure the reliability of this land preserva-
tion tool, the federal agencies that implement and enforce the
ESA should retain a right to enforce any conservation easement
made in conjunction with an HCP. Further, the public should be
able to ensure enforcement of these private land agreements by
bringing actions against agencies based on the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).
Over the past thirty years, conservation easements have
emerged as a favorite land-preserving tool of conservationists.1
The scholarship examining this tool has generally focused on
donated and purchased conservation easements.2 A largely over-
looked category, however, is "exacted conservation easements."3
1 Land use planner William Whyte popularized conservation easements in 1959.
Although voluntary private land protection schemes were not new, Whyte was the
first to label them as "conservation easements" and to articulate clearly an appropri-
ate circumstance for such a tool. Whyte's conservation easements are different from
the ones largely used today. He specifically advocated conservation easements as a
tool for government agencies to apply. William Whyte, Securing Open Space for
Urban America: Conservation Easements, 36 URB. LAND INST. TECHNICAL BULL. 1
(1959). The conservation easement has seen its greatest rise in popularity since the
emergence of land trusts. Land trusts have been growing over the past thirty years
at an incredible rate. See JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVA-
TION EASEMENT HANDBOOK Xi (1988); Land Trust Alliance, 2003 National Land
Trust Census, available at www.lta.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
2 See, e.g., Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sec-
tor Conservation, 8 DUKE ENVrrL. L. & POL'Y F. 209 (1998); Federico Cheever, Pub-
lic Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements:
A Happy Present and A Troubled Future, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1077 (1996); Andrew
Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 2 (1989); John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible
Tool for Land Preservation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319 (1997); Gerald Korngold, Privately
Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Cov-
enants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984); Daniel C. Stockford, Comment,
Property Tax Assessment of Conservation Easements, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
823 (1990); Karen M. White, Note, "Extra" Tax Benefits for Conservation Ease-
ments: A Response to Urban Sprawl, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 103 (1999).
3 Because the category of conservation easements I am examining has gone
largely unstudied, it is also unnamed. I use the term "exacted" because these ease-
ments function in ways similar to other exactions. They are concessions given in
exchange for a right to pursue a development project. Importantly, exacted ease-
ments are not new, but exacted "conservation" easements are. We could also refer
to these easements as coerced, regulatory, mitigation, or involuntary. I choose the
term exacted because it fits more readily into the land use planning framework.
Exacted Conservation Easements
Property owners seeking to change their land must often obtain
federal, state, and local permits. Increasingly, these permits re-
quire mitigation measures when land changes result in environ-
mental impacts like increased pollution or habitat destruction.
At times, these mitigation measures take the form of conserva-
tion easements. Different than the traditionally studied conser-
vation easements, these exacted conservation easements are not
exactly voluntary.4 Exacted easements are secondary mitigation
requirements for landowners seeking to fulfill goals other than
land protection.
Although similar to other conservation easements in structure,
exacted conservation easements are a different creature when it
comes to landowner motivation and tax benefits. The common
picture of conservation easements is a donated or sold easement
where a landowner exchanges property rights in return for long-
term security for her land and various potential tax benefits.5
Exacted conservation easements are not accompanied by wide-
ranging tax benefits and the landowners are not driven by con-
servation as their primary project goal. Because of this differ-
ence, concerns about enforcing these types of easements may be
elevated. Enforcement concerns take a paramount position with
conservation easements created to meet the goals of federal envi-
ronmental statutes. In particular, conservation easements are in-
creasingly a part of HCPs. These endangered species exacted
4 Whether exacted conservation easements are voluntary is a contentious issue.
We may think of them as involuntary because a permit holder is required to create
them in exchange for her permit. Alternatively, we may think of them as voluntary
because a landowner or project proponent engages in the permitting process will-
ingly. They are choosing to develop or change their land under their own free will.
The Supreme Court appeared to reject this second argument in Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 (1987) ("[T]he announcement that the applica-
tion for (or granting of) the permit will entail the yielding of a property interest
cannot be regarded as establishing the voluntary 'exchange."' (citations omitted)).
This dispute may seem merely academic or semantic until we look closer at specific
state statutes. For example, in California, the conservation easement statute clearly
requires that the arrangements be "voluntarily conveyed." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 815.3(b) (West 2004). Therefore, if exacted conservation easements are not volun-
tary, they may not be enforceable under California's conservation easement statute.
Although this would not automatically invalidate an agreement, it would bring into
question the long-term viability of exacted conservation easements in California.
This is a fascinating and important issue to address in light of the multitude of ex-
acted conservation easements being created in California. Unfortunately, however,
there is not room to address it here (nor would it necessarily be appropriate to do
so).
5 See infra discussion at Part I.D.1.
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conservation easements represent an area of special enforcement
concern. The ESA is a federal law with broad ranging goals and
stringent regulations designed to preserve species and prevent
habitat destruction.6 To ensure species protection, it is important
that these conservation easements are both monitored and en-
forced. The outlook is somewhat bleak however. Little is known
about these conservation easements. There are no state or feder-
ally compiled databases and there is no guarantee of consistency
in structure or enforcement of the easements. Therefore, these
exacted conservation easements represent a difficult enforce-
ment situation and bring into question the long-term viability of
conservation easements as a tool to protect habitat. Finding
ways to successfully enforce this "hard case" example of ease-
ments will be informative for enforcement of other types of con-
servation easements. If we can figure out how to create
functioning conservation easements in this constrained context,
other conservation easements should be relatively straight-
forward.
Although some scholars have written on conservation ease-
ments as a tool for biodiversity protection,7 there has been little
mention of conservation easements specifically targeted to meet
the habitat goals outlined in the ESA.8 This is especially surpris-
ing considering the significant role conservation easements play
in HCPs, which are part of the ESA's permitting system. This
Article examines conservation easements in the context of HCPs,
specifically addressing problems of enforcement and concerns
about long-term habitat protection that arise. Section I of this
Article examines the development of conservation easements as
a land preservation strategy. In general, conservation easements
fall into three categories: donated, sold, and exacted. Section I
describes the common structure of conservation easements, gen-
6 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2004).
7 See, e.g., Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic In-
centives and Biodiversity Conversion in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9
(1996); Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserv-
ing the Environment on Private Land, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (2001); Ronald R.
Scott, Private Land Use Controls and Biodiversity Preservation in Kentucky, 11 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 281 (1995-1996); Nancy M. McLaughlin, The Role of
Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38 IDAHo L. REV. 453
(2002).
8 But see Kimberley K. Winter, Comment, The Endangered Species Act Under
Attack: Could Conservation Easements Help Save the ESA? 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
371 (1993).
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erally examining the history of this land conservation tool and
briefly explaining how it evolved from its common law roots.
Section II of this Article details the development of the ESA
and explains its current structure. Section III then takes a close
look at HCPs and Incidental Take Permits. When a landowner
seeks to develop land where either listed species or their habitat
is present, he must apply for and obtain a permit from the De-
partment of the Interior (DOI). As part of the permitting pro-
cess, applicants must prepare an HCP. It has become
commonplace for government agencies to require the creation of
conservation easements as part of these plans. After detailing
the HCP process, Section III(C) explains concerns that arise with
the reviewability and enforceability of HCPs generally. Section
IV looks more closely at the role of conservation easements
within HCPs and the problem of their enforcement. It is not
clear who has the right and ability to enforce the terms of conser-
vation easements that are included in HCPs. Section IV(B) ex-
amines some of the current enforcement strategies and section
IV(C) offers suggestions for addressing the major enforcement
problems.
I
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Conservation easements are property rights in land that are
held by someone other than the landowner and have a conserva-
tion purpose.9 Conservation easements are voluntary restrictions
9 DIEHL & BARRET-r, supra note 1, at 5. Throughout this Article, I use the term
"conservation easement." I chose conservation easement because it is the term most
commonly used in statutes and in the academic literature. However, it is not univer-
sally accepted as the most appropriate term. As explained below, conservation ease-
ments are not easements in the traditional sense. A more appropriate name may be
"conservation servitude" because these agreements represent a type of property ser-
vitude more akin to equitable servitudes or real property covenants. Scholars have
pointed out this inconsistency before. See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 2. But the
term conservation easement seems to have stuck despite these concerns. Academics
are not the only ones who find the term conservation easement inappropriate; states
also use other terms. In Massachusetts, for example, they are called "conservation
restrictions." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 31 (2003). I use the term conservation
easement broadly to encompass a larger category of land restrictions that include
agricultural preservation easements, scenic easements, open space easements, for-
ever-wild easements, conservation restrictions, restrictive covenants, and any other
land restrictions that follow the pattern of divided property rights described in the
text of this Article. Despite my misgivings about using the term "easement," I use
"conservation easement" here to refer generally to private land restrictions with a
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on private land.1" When an owner places a conservation ease-
ment on her land, whether by donating it, selling it, or creating it
to meet legal requirements, she is generally agreeing to refrain
from certain activities.1 ' Although conservation easements can
take many forms, the most common restrict development. Using
the traditional "bundle-of-sticks" metaphor for property, we can
describe the landowner as losing one of the sticks in her bundle.
A conservation easement is in essence taking a stick out of the
bundle and giving it to someone else. State statutes determine
who may accept the right and set rules about the method of
transfer. A conservation easement is not a straightforward trans-
fer of a right, however, because the holder of a conservation
easement cannot exercise the right it holds. For example, if a
landowner donates an easement in the form of restricting the
right to develop her property, the holder of the easement does
not gain the development right. The holder of the conservation
easement can prohibit all development or any development that
interferes with a particular activity or conservation goal. Conser-
vation easements, therefore, are really rights of enforcement.
The holder of the conservation easement has the right to bring an
action against the landowner if the terms of the easement are
violated.
Generally, the easement holder is either a government entity
or a non-profit conservation organization. Many conservation
conservation purpose regardless of official legislative terms. Conservation purposes
generally include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: "protecting his-
torical, architectural, archaeological or cultural aspects of real property." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 1.6 (2000).
10 See Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 322. Although scholarship discussing the
voluntary nature of conservation easements usually addresses donated (and some-
times sold) conservation easements, see, e.g., Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conserva-
tion: Accomplishing the Goal Through Preemptive Federal Easement Programs, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 403 (1993), exacted conservation easements also may
have a voluntary nature. See supra note 3.
11 Although conservation easements are generally thought of as negative restric-
tions preventing landowners from doing certain actions, conservation easements also
may have affirmative obligations. Alexander R. Arpad, Comment, Private Transac-
tions, Public Benefits, and Perpetual Control Over the Use of Real Property: Inter-
preting Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
91, 112-21 (2002) (explaining that the affirmative aspect of conservation easements
is often ignored). States often explicitly recognize both negative restrictions and
affirmative duties in their state conservation easement statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 33-21(1) (2004); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382.800 (Michie 2004); OR.
REV. STAT. § 271.715(1) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-8-20(1) (Law Co-op. 2004);
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(1)(a) (West 2004).
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easements restrict land "in perpetuity." However, because stat-
utes and regulations about conservation easements vary by state,
there may be differences in the length and style of conservation
easements, including limitations on who is allowed to hold the
right.
Conservation easements are different than the traditional no-
tion of easements. Black's Law Dictionary defines easements as:
an interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the
right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it,
for a specific limited purpose .... Unlike a lease or license, an
easement may last forever, but it does not give the holder the
right to possess, take from, improve, or sell the land.12
The most common forms of easements are rights of way, rights
of entry, rights to the support of land and buildings, rights of light
and air, rights to water, rights to do an act that would otherwise
be considered a nuisance, and rights to place or keep something
on an adjacent piece of land. 3 The term conservation easement
is so new it is not yet found in law dictionaries.' 4 The legal con-
cept of a conservation easement is actually a statutory construc-
tion that contradicts principles of common law despite being
closely linked to the traditional notion of easements and
servitudes.
A. Development of the Concept
Increasing population and development pressures have led to
environmental degradation and loss. of open space.' 5 In the
search for flexible solutions to these problems, ways to restrict
the use of private property have developed.' 6 At common law,
there were several different tools for restricting the use of private
property including easements, reaf covenants, and equitable ser-
12 BLACK'S LAW DICLIONARY 414-15 (7th ed. 2000).
13 Id.
14 This does not mean, however, that the concept is new. As will be explained
below, there have been many forms of easements and servitudes in land. Bringing
these ideas together under one workable concept is new however.
15 This problem has been oft-studied and remarked upon. For a specific discus-
sion in the context of the land conservation movement see RICHARD BREWER, CON-
SERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 13 (2003).
16 Many books and articles discuss the emergence of new land preservation tools
and creative property arrangements in response to increased environmental degra-
dation. See, e.g., id.; LAND SAVING ACTION (Russell L. Brenneman & Sarah M.
Bates eds., 1984); PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND CONSERVA-
TION (Montana Land Reliance & Land Trust Exchange eds., 1982).
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vitudes. Planners and conservationists drew on all three of these
tools to protect habitat values, but found them all lacking in
some way. Conservation easements were born out of a desire to
protect conservation values for the long term without requiring
fee-simple purchase of property. 17
1. Types of Land Restrictions Historically Allowed
Today's conservation easements are not constructions tradi-
tionally upheld by courts.1 8 Courts were resistant to allow agree-
ments that separated ownership in land. This section describes
the historical restrictions on land agreements like conservation
easements and discusses why common law courts were resistant
to some of the features that we now see operating in conserva-
tion easements.
a. Only Affirmative Easements Were Permissible
Traditionally, courts generally only upheld affirmative ease-
ments.1 9 Affirmative easements explain what an individual may
do. They describe a right existing in someone other than the
landowner. Negative easements, alternatively, describe a prohi-
bition. Negative easements are restrictions on a property
owner's behavior on her own land-they prohibit a property
owner from doing something on her land. Conservation ease-
ments are often a form of negative easement because they re-
present prohibitions on certain activities (usually development).
At common law, the only accepted negative easements were
those that prevented landowners from blocking the free flow of
air and light.2" Negative easements are harder to enforce be-
cause of the requirements of monitoring and policing.21 Negative
easements also go against traditional American notions of pri-
17 BREWER, supra note 15, at 135; see also Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 322.
18 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 2, at 3.
19 Id. at 12-13.
20 Cheever, supra note 2, at 1081.
21 To exercise an affirmative easement, the easement holder need only perform
the allowed activity. For example, an easement allowing access across a landowner's
property is exercised by crossing that land. The easement is violated when the ease-
ment holder finds some new impediment to her access (e.g., a locked gate). A nega-
tive easement, however, prevents a landowner from doing something instead of
requiring them to allow something. if, for example, a negative easement purports to
restrict hunting on a certain part of land, someone must-monitor the land to ensure
that the hunting never occurs. This requires vigilance on the part of the easement
holder.
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vate property. A person's land is thought to be the place where
he is king. Jeffersonian ideals of individual farmers working the
land in peace and freedom dominate the concept of property in
the United States. Therefore, limits on private behavior are dis-
couraged. The common law exception to the rule against nega-
tive easements, allowing for the free flow of air and light, is more
akin to traditional nuisance law. People may do whatever they
like on their own property, as long as it does not harm others-
such as by blocking their air and light.
Courts viewed negative easements critically whether they were
appurtenant or in gross. Obligations that are connected to the
land instead of to a specific person are called "appurtenant." At
common law, appurtenant negative easements regarding air and
light, as described above, were accepted, while easements not
tied to land were disfavored.22
When an easement is appurtenant, we label the land subject to
the easement the "servient estate. '2 3 The land benefited by the
easement is the dominant estate.24 Using the example of a nega-
tive easement preventing obstruction of light, the owner of the
servient estate may not block the light of the dominant estate.
The benefit here "runs with the land." The owner of the servient
estate may not block the light regardless of who owns the domi-
nant estate. The restriction remains in place even if the domi-
nant estate changes hands. Thus, whoever owns the dominant
estate enjoys the benefit of the appurtenant negative easement.25
The only appurtenant negative easements allowed at common
law benefited neighboring landowners.26 When an easement is
held in gross, it is held by a particular person. Here, the benefit
is not tied to ownership of neighboring land. Concerns regarding
easements in gross are the topic of the next section.
Courts were disinclined to allow current landowners to make
rules affecting subsequent landowners. 27 This could give one
landowner a lot of power over future generations by forever re-
stricting the land. Such restrictions could make it harder to
transfer or sell land and prevent land from being put to its "high-
22 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 2, at 14. Negative easements in gross were disfa-
vored. See, e.g., Dunn Bros., Inc. v. Lesnewsky, 164 Conn. 331 (1973).
23 A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 939 (4th ed. 2000).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Dana & Ramsey, supra note 2, at 14.
27 Id.
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est and best use."' 28 Conservation easement burdens "run with
the land" because the restriction remains in place even when the
land changes hands. The restrictions are incorporated into the
deed and new owners must adhere to the restrictions negotiated
by prior owners of the land.
b. Both the Easement Burden and the Easement Benefit had to
Run with the Land
When looking at the traditional property tools of easements
and real property covenants, we see that courts did not favor
agreements between parties when a landowner's burden or obli-
gation was tied to her land, but the benefit was not.2 9 Easements
"in gross" describe rights not associated with the person who
owns the land; they create a personal right related to the land in
another individual.30 Although easements create a prohibition
that runs with the land, the property right gained by the ease-
ment holder is a right in gross, meaning that it is not associated
with the ownership of land. When underlying land is transferred,
rights in gross are not affected.31 Courts may have disfavored
this structure because of the increased enforcement burdens it
creates. When an easement is connected to a piece of property
(i.e., the easement holder is always the next-door neighbor), it is
easier to track who has the right associated with the easement
and who can bring enforcement actions. There are no require-
ments that tie conservation easements to neighboring land.
Holders of conservation easements may be located anywhere and
may move around without disrupting their conservation ease-
ment property right. Thus, conservation easements can be char-
acterized as negative easements in gross, which are not a
character of the common law at all.
While negative easements represent restrictions on a property
owner's behavior, covenants are more like promises regarding
the land.32 Therefore, conservation easements are sometimes
viewed as similar to real property covenants.33 However, under
common law, covenants in gross cannot bind a successor in inter-
est and the parties must intend both the burden and the benefit
28 Id. at 3.
29 CASNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 941.
30 Id. at 940.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 939.
33 See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 2, at 436 (supporting this characterization).
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to run with the land 4.3  Essentially, under the common law, a bur-
den would not run with the land if the benefit was in gross.35
Although the burden runs with the land for conservation ease-
ments, the benefit does not. Additionally, options for remedies
might dissuade us from characterizing conservation easements as
covenants. A violation of a real covenant was traditionally en-
forced with an award of damages, which is inappropriate for con-
servation goals.36
Some scholars characterize conservation easements as more in
line with the common law notion of equitable servitudes.37 An
equitable servitude is a promise that runs with the land much like
a covenant. 38 However, there are no privity requirements, mean-
ing that enforcement is not confined to those who are party to
the agreement. 39 Additionally, equitable servitudes at common
law were typically enforced by injunction, ° which is the most ap-
propriate enforcement mechanism to meet the goals of conserva-
tion easements. There is one key difference between
conservation easements and equitable servitudes though-tradi-
tionally equitable servitudes could not be held in gross n.4  The
prohibition on holding equitable servitudes in gross makes them
an inappropriate tool for widespread conservation. Conservation
organizations and government entities would not be able to ne-
gotiate enforceable agreements under this rubric.
2. Conservation Easements were not Allowed under
Traditional Common Law Concepts of Property
As can be seen from the above section, conservation ease-
ments differ from traditional property constructs in several key
aspects. The main policy reasons behind disfavoring conserva-
tion easements under the common law arise from concerns about
agreements in perpetuity. Perpetual agreements give a lot of de-
cision-making power to a present landowner. There is a long-
34 Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1269-71 (1982).
35 Id.
36 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 381-82.
37 See, e.g., Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 331-32.
38 French, supra note 34, at 1276-81.
39 Id. at 1276-77.
40 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 382-83.
41 Id. at 383; Jeffrey Tapick, Note, Threats to the Continued Existence of Conserva-
tion Easements, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257, 271 (2002).
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standing objection to restrictions on land that limit transfer of
land and restrictions on land that prohibit property owners from
controlling their own land long after the death of those party to
the original agreement.4 2 This concern about a "dead hand" con-
trolling present day actions from the grave gave rise to tradi-
tional property conventions like the rule against perpetuities
4 3
and the rule against restraints on alienation." Professor Lewis
Simes argued that it is more socially desirable to have property
controlled by the living, who are more apt to make economically
optimal land-use decisions.45 This is rooted in the concern that
conservation easements will lock land into inefficient uses and
prevent "natural" development.46
Additionally, common law courts had concerns about the long-
term stability of easements that lasted through changes in owner-
ship of the underlying land.47 Although land does not move
around, the businesses or entities holding the development right
or other benefit might. This could increase the transaction costs
involved in land transfer. It would be more difficult to ascertain
what restrictions were on lands.4" Thus, there are many doubts
about the reliability of conservation easements, especially con-
cerning what might occur as land changes hands.4 9
Other concerns, such as worries about creating non-competi-
tive business arrangements, led courts and scholars to hesitate in
their endorsement of perpetually restricting property use agree-
ments like conservation easements. Courts seem to envision spe-
cific examples where restrictions on the land would create
42 Cheever, supra note 2, at 1098-1100.
43 The goal of the rule against perpetuities is to prevent landowners indefinitely
controlling who inherits the land. CASNER, supra note 23, at 342.
44 See id. at 306; Dana & Ramsey, supra note 2, at 22.
45 LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59-60 (The Thomas M.
Cooley Lectures, 6th Series, 1955).
46 Id.
47 See French, supra note 34, at 1282.
48 Although conservation easements are supposed to be incorporated into deed
restrictions, they may still be difficult to track down or to understand. This author
has often heard anecdotal evidence about landowners ignorant of conservation ease-
ments encumbering their property. This includes stories where landowners learned
of existing conservation easements only when trying to create new conservation
easements restricting already encumbered land. Additionally, state laws regarding
marketable title may lead to inconsistent recordation. See Dana & Ramsey, supra
note 2, at 20.
49 See generally Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doc-
trine of Changed Conditions, 40 HASnNGs L.J. 1187 (1989).
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restrictions on competition.50 For example, arrangements to
transfer property could be bound by agreements designed to
benefit sellers' businesses.'
B. Conservation Easements Today
1. State Statutes and the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
Because of common law obstacles, states have passed laws to
legitimate the creation of successful conservation easement pro-
grams. Every state but one now has laws on conservation ease-
ments.5 2 There are currently forty-nine states with conservation
easement statutes53-affecting over three million acres of land
nationwide.54 The oldest identifiable conservation easement stat-
utes were adopted in 1956 in Massachusetts55 and in 1959 in Cali-
fornia.5 6 These early laws provided little guidance on how
50 CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN
wIT- THE LAND" 84 (1929); see also Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d
243, 246 (Mass. 1979) (invalidating a covenant restricting commercial competition
because the benefit and burden did not "touch and concern" the affected parcels).
51 These concerns are akin to antitrust worries. Laws have developed that address
these concerns directly. If we are worried about business competition, statutes
should focus on business competition, not prohibitions on covenants and servitudes.
52 Sixteen states have adopted the UCEA directly while five others use it as a
model for their own state laws. SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSER-
VATION TRUSTS 152 (2001); Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, History of the Uni-
form Conservation Easement Act (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
53 See Michael R. Eitel, Comment, Wyoming's Trepidation Toward Conservation
Easement Legislation: A Look at Two Issues Troubling the Wyoming State Legisla-
ture, 4 Wvo. L. REV. 57, 66 n.68 (2004); North Dakota, H.C.R. 3023 (enacted 2001)
available at http://www.state.nd.us/lr/assembly/57-2001/bill-text/BRFBO200.pdf.
54 Nancy McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement
Donations-A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 21 (2004). McLaugh-
lin's article shows the amount of land protected by conservation easements that are
held by land trusts; the total acreage protected by government entities is unknown,
this number is likely much higher.
55 1956 Mass. Acts ch. 631.
56 1959 Cal. Stat. 1658, p. 4035, § 1 (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954
(2004)). Although these are the oldest conservation easement statutes, scholars
show conservation easements as dating back much farther. The first American con-
servation easement appears to have been written in the late 1880s to protect the
parks and parkways of Boston designed by Frederick Law Olmstead. Julie Ann
Gustanksi, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary Actions, and
Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRE-
SENT, AND FUTURE 9 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000); Jean
Hocker, Foreword to PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE xvii (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
These older conservation easements were born without statute and therefore courts
could have chosen to overturn them if challenged based on common law structures
discussed in the previous section. Additionally, although there is a rich history of
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conservation easements should operate; therefore, few landown-
ers took advantage of them.57 Initially, the California and Mas-
sachusetts statutes only authorized government agencies to hold
the easements,58 but in 1969, Massachusetts became the first state
to allow non-profits to hold conservation easements.59
Many states with conservation easement statutes model their
regulation on the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(UCEA).6 ° In 1981, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved the current UCEA.61  The
UCEA defines a conservation easement as:
A nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing
limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which in-
clude retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space
values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural,
forest, recreational or open-space use, protecting natural re-
sources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or pre-
serving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural
aspects of real property.62
The UCEA allows easements to be made in perpetuity, 63
which enables donated easements to qualify for federal tax bene-
fits. 64 Additionally, the UCEA places limitations on who may
hold the property interest. It limits the definition of holder to:
(i) a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real
property under the laws of this State or the United States; or
(ii) a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charita-
ble trust, the purposes or powers of which include retaining or
protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property ... 65
conservation easements, they were still considered an obscure tool. Indeed, the first
publication about conservation easements was not written until 1959. WHr'm, supra
note 1; see also Hocker, supra. Even today's scholars, practitioners, and landowners
tend to think of conservation easements as a "new" tool. See Hollingshead, supra
note 2, at 325-34 (describing the history of conservation easements).
57 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 385.
58 Cheever, supra note 2, at 1080.
59 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 385.60 NCCUSL, Uniform Law Commissioners, UCEA fact sheet, at www. nccusl.org/
update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucea.asp (last accessed Jan. 12, 2005).
61 Unif. Conservation Easement Act, 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981), available at
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ucea8l.pdf.
62 Id, § 1(1).
63 Unless state law provides otherwise, the UCEA framework assumes conserva-
tion easements are created in perpetuity. Id. § 2(c).
64 See infra Section I.D.1.
65 Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 2(c).
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Nearly every state has some type of conservation easement
statute. In fact, only Wyoming does not have a specific conserva-
tion easement law on its books.66 The state laws on conservation
easements generally share the trait of trading development and
certain use rights for some level of tax break, but there are also
many variations within the laws. For example, some state conser-
vation easement statutes relate only to scenic and public access
easements; these statutes often fall short of protecting biodivers-
ity.67 Some statutes say that you cannot prohibit certain activi-
ties. For example, in Delaware, hunting, fishing, and other
recreational activity must always be allowed. 68 Kentucky actu-
ally has rules about particular mining operations, including a pro-
vision that prohibits conservation easements from interfering
with coal mining.69 Some states have specific time limits on con-
servation easements, while other states require them to be in
perpetuity. For example, Kansas, which has potentially the
shortest time allowance, limits conservation easements to the
lifetime of the grantor.71 Many states have mechanisms for re-
lease from conservation easement obligations, while other states
do not. In general, most states require conservation easements
to be released or modified in certain circumstances, as other
easements can be.71 For example, in Iowa, a conservation ease-
ment may be released when it ceases to be beneficial to the pub-
lic, or the holder of the easement can choose to release it.72 In
Kansas, the grantor of the conservation easement can revoke it.73
66 See supra note 53. Wyoming still has conservation easements that rely on com-
mon law notions of real covenants, easements, and equitable servitudes. See gener-
ally Eitel, supra note 53; Tapick, supra note 42, at 265-66. Additionally, Wyoming
residents can still take advantage of federal tax breaks if they adhere to the I.R.C.
guidelines. See infra part I.D.1. The federal tax guidelines do not require conserva-
tion easements to comply with state law.
67 See David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for
Management or Compensation for Lost Expectations? 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
303, 346-47 (1995) (stating that public access easements and scenic easements may
not be in the public interest).
68 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(c) (2001).
69 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382.850(1) (Michie 2004). This directly conflicts with
recent changes to the federal income tax laws, which do not allow conservation ease-
ments in conjunction with mining operations meaning that Kentucky landowners
should not be able to benefit from the federal tax deductions. I.R.S. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(g).
70 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(d) (2003).
71 Cheever, supra note 2, at 1083.
72 IOWA CODE ANN. § 457A.2(1) (West 1997).
73 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(d) (2001).
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In New Jersey, a conservation easement can be released after a
public hearing.7 4 Some states have more stringent restrictions
than others on who may hold a conservation easement. While
some states allow any type of non-profit, others require that the
non-profit have I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) tax status, and still others go
further by declaring that the non-profit must have conservation
of natural resources or historic preservation as one of its primary
purposes.7"
2. Societal Benefits of Conservation Easements Override
Common Law Concerns
Although there are many well-founded and valid concerns
about conservation easements, concerns about conservation and
a desire to preserve land and open space appear to be stronger.
Stability concerns about conservation easements have not disap-
peared. Whenever we have perpetual agreements with limited
rights of enforcement, there will be concerns about what will
happen as the years go by. However, restrictions on who can
hold a conservation easement have lessened some of these con-
cerns. Today, the federal tax code and most state statutes require
that conservation easements be held by either a government en-
tity or a non-profit organization with a conservation purpose.
This is because the government is accountable to the people, and
non-profits are accountable to their members; theoretically these
are stable entities who will ensure that the terms of the conserva-
tion easements are being related to new landowners and being
adhered to by all.
3. Conservation Easements do not Solve all the Common Law
Problems
Conservation easements are not a magic tool that solve all
common law concerns. 76 The reasons courts disfavored conser-
vation easements have not entirely disappeared. There are still
concerns about the perpetual aspect of these agreements. Addi-
74 N.J. Rev. STAT. § 13:8B-5 (1980). A more complete list of statute release pro-
visions can be found in Cheever, supra note 2, at 1083 n.46.
75 See, e.g., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-104(5)(c) (2002); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 815.3(a) (West 1982); Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(2), 12 U.L.A. 170
(1981). See also Morrisette, supra note 7, at 388, for a discussion of other specific
state restrictions.
76 But see generally Cheever, supra note 2, at 1077-78 (describing the use of con-
servation easements by land trusts as "magic").
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tionally, some scholars point out that conservation easements are
a strange mix of public and private land together; therefore,
there may be some unarticulated public rights like access and
recreation. 7 Further, as this Article articulates in section IV,
there are continuing worries about the enforcement of these
agreements. States did not pass statutes codifying rules about
easements because they had discovered a new solution to age-old
problems, but because societal attitudes had evolved to the point
were the new concerns overrode the old worries.
C. Forms of Conservation Easements
1. Donations
Many landowners donate conservation easements on their
land. There may be many reasons for the donation, the chief of
which are usually a desire to preserve the character of their land
and a desire to receive tax breaks as described below. Much of
the research related to conservation easements has focused on
these donated conservation easements, looking at the motiva-
tions of the donors and the intricacies of the tax breaks.
78
2. Sales
Conservation easements, like other property rights, can be
bought and sold. Because there is no clearinghouse for ease-
ments, it is not discernable what percentage of easements are
sold by landowners. The chief motivation for selling easements is
likely to be the money made from their sale, but landowners may
also be motivated by retaining the character of their land and
their way of life or gaining some tax benefits.
3. Exactions
Many conservation easements are born under very different
circumstances than the previous two categories. Donated and
sold conservation easements are actions voluntarily initiated by
77 See, e.g., Jeff Pidot, Reinventing Conservation Easements - A Work in Progress
(prepared for a conference on regulatory takings at UCLA in 2004) (paper on file
with author and also available through the Lincoln Policy Institute); see also BAY
AREA OPEN SPACE DisTRicr, ENSURING THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATION EASE-
MENTs (1999), available at http://www.openspacecouncil.org/Documents/ Ease-
ments/EnsuringThePromise.pdf; FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 52, at 236 n.5.
78 See generally Tapick, supra note 41; McLaughlin, supra note 7; Dana & Ram-
sey, supra note 2; White, supra note 2.
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landowners. Sometimes, instead of being part of private deci-
sions about the future of one family's farm, conservation ease-
ments are part of large development projects with complex
permitting programs. When developers and individual landown-
ers want to make changes to the land, there are often local, state,
and federal permit requirements. 79 Many of these permit pro-
grams require larger projects to incorporate some type of conser-
vation for mitigation.8 ° Conservation easements are one of the
most common methods of meeting these requirements. 81 These
conservation easements are of a different sort than donated and
sold conservation easements. Developers may be required to
place some type of conservation easement on their own land or
to purchase a conservation easement on someone else's land.
Although they engage in the transactions willingly, the ease-
ments should not be viewed in the same light. Both the incen-
tives and benefits of these types of conservation easements are
very different than those for donated and sold easements.
D. Conservation Easements are Becoming a Key Element of
Land Conservation
Despite their awkwardness, conservation easements continue
to gain popularity with landowners, government agencies, and
conservation organizations. Indeed, conservation easements are
the most widely used tool for conservation in the private sector.8 2
Their popularity draws in large part from the tax incentives that
accompany conservation easements as well as their flexibility.
1. Tax Breaks
One of the chief benefits of donating or selling a conservation
easement is the potential of significant tax benefits. Federal law
provides tax breaks to landowners who donate easements based
on the value of the easement as a charitable donation.83 There
79 See RicHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 194-96
(2004).
80 See, e.g., General Policies For Evaluating Permit Applications, Clean Water Act
§ 404 Permit Regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (2005); Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2004).
81 Interview with Clark Morrison, Partner, Morrison & Foerster (Oct. 8, 2003);
interview with David Nawi, Of Counsel, Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger (Nov. 17,
2003).
82 Gustanski, supra note 56, at 9.
83 I.R.C. § 170 (2000). To calculate the value of the donation, you take the value
of the land before the easement and compare it to the value of the land when en-
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are also estate tax benefits both because the fair market value of
the land encumbered is reduced and because a 1997 change to
the Internal Revenue Code allowed for a reduction of estate
taxes for certain qualified easements.'
State tax benefits vary, but there are often reductions in prop-
erty tax. The tax benefits encourage landowners to set aside
their land and serve as a counterweight to development pres-
sures. For landowners to reap all the possible advantages of con-
servation easements, they must conform to both state and federal
law.85
In 1964, changes to the Internal Revenue Code formally de-
fined conservation easements at the federal level and allowed in-
come tax deductions for conservation easements donated to
charitable organizations including government agencies. 86 The
Internal Revenue Service allows for a federal income tax deduc-
tion for qualified charitable contributions up to a maximum of
thirty percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 87 How-
ever, the value of the easement donation can be spread over five
years.88
Conservation easements also reduce the fair market value of
the underlying land. This can reduce valuation for purposes of
local property taxes. Some of the most attractive tax breaks as-
sociated with easements, however, are related to estate taxes.
High estate taxes make conservation easements attractive to
landowners when they begin to make plans for passing on their
land to heirs. Stephen Small, a Boston attorney specializing in
cumbered by the easement. The difference is the value of the donation. For more
about the valuation process and its potential problems, see McLaughlin, supra note
55 (explaining the difficulty in determining the appropriate value of the donation
and the incentives of landowners to overestimate).
84 American Farm & Ranch Protection Act, I.R.C. § 2031(c) (2000). For a discus-
sion of this provision and which conservation easements qualify for the deduction,
see Stephen J. Small, An Obscure Tax Code Provision Takes Private Land Protection
into the Twenty-First Century, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASE-
MENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 60-65 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H.
Squires, eds., 2000).
85 Cheever, supra note 2, at 1084.
8 6 Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. 88-272; see also FAIRFAX & GUENZLER supra note 52, at
10, 152.
87 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2003). The amount of a contribution exceeding thirty percent
of the adjusted gross income in a given year can be carried over and deducted for
the next five years.
88 Id.; McLaughlin, supra note 55 (explaining various easement related tax incen-
tives in detail).
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conservation easements, identifies estate taxes as the driving
force behind the rise in conservation easements.89 With the cur-
rent level of estate taxes and the continuing increase in property
values, many families find themselves forced to sell their inher-
ited property merely to cover the estate taxes.90 Easements re-
duce the value of the land and the corresponding estate tax.
Furthermore, recent changes to the tax code allow additional es-
tate tax deductions for landowners who place easements on
property near metropolitan areas, national parks, wilderness ar-
eas, and urban national forests.91
Exacted conservation easements arising from mitigation re-
quirements do not yield the same tax benefits. Because they are
permit requirements, not donations, there can be no charitable
deduction for these "coerced easements."9 Although these
easements might look the same as others on the ground, the lack
of donative intent prevents them from qualifying for charitable
tax benefits.93 However, the existence of conservation easements
still reduces the fair market value of the land; thus, the landown-
ers qualify for any property and estate tax breaks that accom-
pany lower property values.9 4 This tax break only benefits a
permit holder who creates a conservation easement on her own
89 Lynn Asinof, Conservation Easements Lighten Taxes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1991,
at C1.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 The difference between these voluntary and involuntary easements may not
seem very significant, but the differing attitudes of the easement purchasers, sellers,
and holders may affect later enforcement. A conservation easement on family land
to protect the family farm that remains in one family over the course of generations
may be more likely to be complied with. Landowner incentive may be a significant
factor in the success of conservation easements. Research on the characteristics of
conservation easements that make them more or less likely to meet their conserva-
tion goals is currently underway at University of California - Berkeley in the De-
partment of Environmental Science, Policy & Management.
93 Most tax courts disallow deductions where there is a lack of donative intent.
See, e.g., Pettit v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 634 (1974); Saba v. Commissioner, 40
T.C.M. (CCH) 466 (1980).
94 As will be discussed later, in some instances, there is no change in property
values when a conservation easement is placed on endangered species habitat. Even
without the conservation easement, the landowner may be prevented from develop-
ing if doing so would result in harm to the species. Therefore, if the value of the
land is properly assessed before being encumbered by the conservation easement,
the appraisal should account for the development restrictions, making the before
and after encumbrance values nearly equal. Thus, the current donation valuation
measure for conservation easement on endangered species habitat would not yield a
tax break.
Exacted Conservation Easements
land as opposed to purchasing a conservation easement on land
owned by another party.
2. Conservation Motivations
There are many different personal incentives for creating con-
servation easements. Private landowners often create conserva-
tion easements to protect personal values. Property owners who
do not want to see their land turned into a strip mall or want to
make sure that the family farm remains a farm look to easements
to protect their interests in the land. Some landowners may have
pure conservation motives-a wish to protect a certain species or
habitat for example. Many people who donate easements cite
the ability to leave a lasting mark on the land as their strongest
incentive.9" This type of altruistic incentive may also influence
people who sell easements on their land. Alternately, landown-
ers who are required to create conservation easements to meet
permit conditions are usually trying to develop land. Altruistic
incentives do not often come into play for these developers be-
cause they are actively trying to change or expand the current
uses of the land.
3. Avoidance of Federal Involvement
Conservation easements may be a promising solution to the
dilemma of balancing private property development interests
and conservation. When landowners willingly enter into conser-
vation easement transactions with private land conservation or-
ganizations, the exchange appears to avoid the unpleasantness of
government land regulation. Such conservation easements are
agreements entered into willingly and, at times, even enthusiasti-
cally. Landowners can donate or sell their easement to a local
land trust and keep the transaction both local and out of govern-
ment hands.96 The absence of federal government involvement is
one of the chief benefits of donated and sold conservation ease-
ments noted by scholars.97 That advantage is lost when the ease-
ment is the direct result of a federal permit requirement.
95 Asinof, supra note 89, at C1.
96 Conservation easements often have federal ties because of funding, but these
are not necessarily felt directly by the landowner.
97 See, e.g., James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation:
Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 211
(2000).
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4. A Cheaper and More Efficient Way to Conserve Land
Conservation organizations value conservation easements as a
land protection tool because they are a less expensive way to
protect a larger acreage. The holders of conservation easement
development rights may not exercise those rights. They can no
more develop the land than the original landowner can. They
have gained instead something less tangible -- their actions con-
tribute to values like habitat conservation, open space, etc. We
all benefit from these things. Thus, the holder of the easement is
given a burden -- they must manage, monitor, and uphold the
conservation easement while everyone reaps the benefits. This is
why conservation easements are generally held by either govern-
ment agencies or non-profit organizations.
Conservation easements are attractive to government agencies
and conservation organizations because they provide a more effi-
cient way to conserve land. Conservation organizations, for ex-
ample, need only purchase the rights required to protect the
environmental benefits not the entire fee-simple title to the land.
Because conservation easements are less costly, easements may
be used to shield more total land area from development than
fee-simple purchases.
Conservation easements are also an attractive tool because
they add relatively few new administrative burdens. This is espe-
cially true when the easements are held by private organizations.
Essentially, the federal government can pass its conservation
duty onto non-governmental organizations who then monitor
and enforce federally mandated agreements.
E. Enforcement Concerns About Conservation Easements
The most pressing concern with both voluntary and coercive
conservation easements is enforcement. 98 Conservation ease-
ments take many forms and are held by many different entities.
Many conservation easements are held by local land trusts. Land
trusts come in a variety of shapes and sizes, but they are gener-
ally non-profit organizations with conservation as a central goal.
98 Of course, there are many other concerns relating to easements such as the
problems of valuation and the implications of passing federal responsibilities to pri-
vate organizations. These concerns are not the topic of this Article, however. Be-
cause conservation easements achieve nothing if they are not viable and
enforceable, I consider enforceability a key ingredient to workable conservation
easement programs.
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Many of these groups protect land by purchasing property rights
and accepting donations of property rights -- both full fee title
and conservation easements. These groups are often newly
formed with few staff.99 It is not clear whether these groups have
enough capacity to both monitor and enforce complex easements
well into the future. This becomes of greater concern as the un-
derlying land passes to new landowners. Second and third gener-
ation landowners may be less familiar with the easements and
less motivated to respect the restrictions. These concerns are ex-
plored in more detail in Section IV below.
Conservation easements may also be held by government enti-
ties. These can be local, state, or federal agencies. Many of the
earliest conservation easements were held by federal agencies.
The National Park Service acquired scenic easements along the
Blue Ridge Parkway in the 1930s.1°° Additionally, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service acquired conservation easements through-
out the country in the 1930s and 1940s to protect habitat for spe-
cies covered under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.1 1 In fact, the
earliest conservation easement statutes only permitted govern-
ment agencies to hold them.1"2 Although we generally think of
government as a relatively stable force, enforcement concerns re-
main even with these well-established entities. As political agen-
das, funding mechanisms, and staffs change, governmental
organizations may vary in their ability to monitor and enforce
conservation easements effectively. Indeed, a recent study by the
Bay Area Open Space District shows that conservation ease-
ments held by government agencies may be in a more precarious
position than those held by private organizations.
10 3
This section has presented a general picture of conservation
easements, briefly outlining the emergence of conservation ease-
ments from the common law and explaining general concerns
with the tool. Although this section has described conservation
easements generally, this Article is chiefly concerned with ex-
99 This is not always true, of course. The Nature Conservancy and the Trust for
Public Land are two of the largest easement holders in the nation. They are both
well-established groups with significant funding, history, and staff.
100 Hocker, supra note 56, at xvii.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1974).
102 See, e.g., 1956 Mass. Acts ch. 631; 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1658, p. 4035, § 1 (codified
at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954 (1959)).
103 See BAY AREA OPEN SPACE COUNCIL, ENSURING THE PROMISE OF CONSER-
VATION EASEMENTS 28 (1999), available at http://www.openspacecouncil. org/Docu-
ments/Easements/ensuringThe Promise.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
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acted conservation easements. The remainder of the Article ex-
plores the specific concerns raised by that category of
conservation easements. Specifically, I examine the example of
conservation easements exacted to meet the goals of the ESA.
These exacted easements arise in a constrained area where signif-
icant public policy goals of endangered species protection con-
flict with land development goals. This constrained situation
presents a difficult category of conservation easements meriting
close examination.
!I
ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT
Species are going extinct at an alarming rate. Although the
exact numbers are uncertain, anthropogenic causes have acceler-
ated the rate to levels that parallel the loss in diversity that ac-
companies mass extinctions. °4 The current extinction rate is the
highest in sixty-five million years.'0 5 Humans, who are signifi-
cantly influencing global ecosystems, are triggering this down-
ward spiral.1" 6 The number one cause of species extinction is
habitat destruction. 07 Private lands are an important element of
any biodiversity or species protection regime. Approximately
fifty percent of the species listed under the ESA are found only
on private lands and many more have substantial parts of their
remaining range on private property." 8
It is not surprising that private lands have high habitat value.
Very few ecosystems in the United States exist solely on public
lands.'0 9 One quarter of all ecosystem types are inadequately
represented on public lands and seven percent of ecosystems are
not found on public land at any level. 10 One-half of all
threatened and endangered species are exclusively on private
lands, with over twenty percent of the remainder spending at
104 Clark & Downes, supra note 7, at 9.
105 Jacqueline Lesley Brown, Preserving Species: The Endangered Species Act
Versus Ecosystem Management Regime, Ecological and Political Considerations, and
Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 151, 153 (1997).
106 Id. at 154-55; AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE
HUMAN SPIRIT 30 (1993).
107 JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RunE, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 226 (Robert C. Clerk et al. eds., 2002).
108 Clark & Downes, supra note 7, at 10.
109 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 374.
110 Id. at 374. Wetlands, for example, are almost entirely privately owned.
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least half of their time on private lands."' Additionally, private
lands are more vulnerable to fragmentation and landowners
often face intense pressure to develop.
To protect these areas, local and federal governments have
generally turned to strict "command-and-control" style regula-
tion.1 2 This means prohibitions on building, limitations on activ-
ities, and governmental control of private action. These
techniques have had mixed results both ecologically and politi-
cally. Most significantly, states and the federal government have
enacted endangered species acts. While the specifics of the acts
vary, the goals remain the same: protect endangered species and
their habitat. The federal ESA involves strong restrictions on
governmental activities accompanied by restrictions on private
landowners.
A strong belief in private property rights, accompanied by a
distrust of bureaucracy and governmental regulation by much of
the country, has inspired government agencies, activists, and
scholars to explore new mechanisms for environmental protec-
tion. In recent years, property rights advocates have been claim-
ing that regulations have gone too far.1 1 3 In response to this
concern, communities, developers, and government agencies are
adopting market-based approaches to habitat conservation."14
The search for ways to protect endangered species habitat and
preserve private property rights has led to the use of a variety of
new institutions and tools, including conservation easements.
Protection of the environment has created tension between
conservation and development. Indeed, some see land conserva-
tion as sacrificing the interests of private landowners to achieve a
public benefit." 5 The private property rights movement poses a
significant threat to the protection of biodiversity. Some scholars
have characterized the movement as "the most serious obstacle
111 Id.
112 LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND IMPACr ASSESS-
MENT 163-65 (1997). Command and control is a phrase used to indicate that strict
standards and requirements are used to meet environmental goals. Stringent com-
mands, monitoring, and sanctions for non-compliance mark regulations of this type.
This technique can be contrasted with economic or efficiency-based regulation.
113 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8-9
(1997). Property rights advocates have generally allied themselves with the wise-use
movement, but the groups have only had limited success in achieving their goals thus
far. Id.
114 Clark & Downes, supra note 7, at 50.
115 Boyd et al., supra note 98, at 211.
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to efforts to protect biodiversity and the environment
generally." '116
In 1973, Congress passed the ESA.117 Probably the most
strongly biocentric law of the United States, the ESA establishes
a program to protect threatened and endangered species and the
ecosystems upon which they depend.' 18 Congress enacted the
ESA in response to findings that economic growth and develop-
ment had both endangered the existence of many species and
driven others to extinction." 9 The ESA's purpose is to "provide
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species
and threatened species depend may be conserved [and] to pro-
vide a program for the conservation of such endangered species
and threatened species. '"120 Rooted in the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution, the ESA recognizes the aesthetic, ecological,
recreational, and scientific value of preserving species and bi-
odiversity generally. 2 ' To meet these goals, the ESA imposes
strict requirements on both public and private actions. In gen-
eral, the ESA makes it illegal to import, export, trade, take, pos-
sess, or transport such species. 1 22
Congress's intent to set species protection as paramount has
been upheld and recognized by the courts. 23 People from every
part of the political spectrum have heavily criticized the ESA.
The two most significant complaints are the potential for the
ESA to infringe on private property rights and the narrowness of
the ESA's species-specific framework. Internationally, where
land has been managed for specific species, it has often been to
the detriment of natural ecosystems. 24
116 Clark & Downes, supra note 7, at 73.
117 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973).
118 Id. § 1531(b); Lara M. Bernstein, Comment, Ecosystem Communities: Zoning
Principles to Promote Conservation and the Economy, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1309, 1312 (1995).
119 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1)-(2).
120 Id. § 1531(b).
121 Id. § 1531(a)(3).
122 Id. § 1538.
123 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176-92 (1978) (stopping a large federal
dam project in order to protect the snail darter because Congress's intent was read
as requiring halts to projects that would hurt endangered species "whatever the
cost").
124 Farrier, supra note 67, at 307.
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A. Section 4: Listing and Critical Habitat Designation
The ESA is based on listing species as threatened or endan-
gered. Federal protection for a species is triggered once the DOI
lists the species in the Federal Register as either threatened or
endangered.12 5 The Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary)
makes a decision to list a species as either threatened or endan-
gered based on the biological health of the species.' 6 In making
this decision, the Secretary must use available scientific and com-
mercial data. Because listing decisions must be based solely on
scientific factors, the Secretary cannot consider the private prop-
erty impacts of listing decisions.' 27 Although the listing of a spe-
cies does not itself lead to restrictions on private property,
requirements that accompany listing can have serious impacts.
Simultaneous with the listing of a species as threatened or endan-
gered, section 4 of the ESA requires that the Secretary designate
critical habitat for the species to the "maximum extent prudent
and determinable.' '1 28
B. Section 7: Protection of Species
Section 7 is one of the more significant provisions of the ESA.
It requires federal agencies to ensure that all actions they under-
take conform with the ESA.'2 9 Specifically, agencies must en-
sure that their actions will not put any listed species in jeopardy.
Agency actions are broadly defined to encompass the issuing of
federal permits in conjunction with statutes like the Clean Air
Act, the Clean Water Act, and the ESA itself. Section 7 also
recognizes the harm to species caused by habitat destruction, and
the accompanying regulations prohibit any modification of
habitat that could directly or indirectly "diminish[ ] the value of
critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed
species.' 130
C. Section 9: Prohibition of Takings
Some ESA requirements extend beyond federal agencies to
impact private parties. Under section 9, any activity that harms,
125 Bernstein, supra note 118, at 1312.
126 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2004).
127 See id. § 1533(b)(1).
128 Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
129 See id. § 1536(a)(2).
130 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1994).
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or could harm, a listed species or its habitat131 is prohibited un-
less it receives specific governmental approval. The ESA prohib-
its any person within the jurisdiction of the United States from
"taking" any listed wildlife or fish species.' 32 The ESA broadly
defines "take" to include "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect."' 33 Harm has been further
defined in agency regulations as including "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering."' 34 This standard can
impact private individuals who want to modify or develop their
land.
D. Section 10. Incidental Take Permits
In 1982, Congress responded to growing protests from devel-
opers by amending the ESA to provide partial relief from the
section 9 ban on habitat modification. The amendments created
"incidental take permits."'135 These permits allow landowners to
develop their land even when the land serves as endangered spe-
cies habitat as long as the taking of individual species is "inciden-
tal to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity."' 36 To obtain these permits, landowners wishing
to develop or modify their land must prepare an HCP.13 7 These
habitat plans set forth the details of the development and provide
for mitigation of any harmful effects. HCPs and their accompa-
nying incidental take permits give developers flexibility and a
greater degree of economic certainty.'38 HCPs generally require
landowners to mitigate the harm created by their proposed pro-
131 Note that this section prohibits taking of "habitat" not "critical habitat." Criti-
cal habitat and actual habitat are two different things. Critical habitat is only that
habitat specifically designated as such by the Secretary. Habitat for purposes of
section 9 refers to any actual habitat of a listed species. Thus, if a species is present
on the land, modification of that land is restricted even if the land is not officially
designated critical habitat.
132 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). This section does not cover insects and plants.
133 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
134 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). The Supreme Court upheld this definition of harm,
despite a vigorous dissent, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 707 (1995).
135 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
136 See id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
137 Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
138 Bernstein, supra note 118, at 1317.
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ject.'39 The mitigation projects often take the form of conserva-
tion easements.
lI
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS
Habitat loss is the single greatest cause of species extinction."4
The ESA seeks to promote habitat conservation through the reg-
ulation of both federal and private activities. Section 9 of the
ESA has the most direct impact on private landowners, because
it prohibits "taking" of listed species by any person whether the
species are on public or private lands. 4' Section 3 defines "take"
to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such con-
duct.""' 2 Much has turned on the definition of the word
"harm""' 3 and many landowners worry that any action they take
could in some way result in "harm" to a species. The ESA has
actually created a perverse incentive, where property owners in-
tentionally destroy habitat before species can obtain listed
status.144
Before the 1982 amendments to the ESA created a provision
for incidental takes, the only allowable takes were those associ-
ated with scientific research. Congress created the incidental
take permitting system to give developers flexibility. In particu-
lar, Congress was acknowledging a need to balance economic
pressures and species preservation. The conservation plans and
section 10 permits were designed to help foster "creative partner-
ships" between the public and private sectors and state, munici-
pal, and federal agencies.' 45
As mentioned above, the amendments authorized the Secre-
tary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior ("the Secre-
139 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii).
140 Clark & Downes, supra note 7, at 49.
141 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C).
142 Id. § 1532(19) (emphasis added).
143 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687 (1995) (upholding harm as a significant habitat modification); Forest Conserva-
tion Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding imminent
threat of harm is actionable as a "taking" under the Act); Palila v. Haw. Dep't of
Land and Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1990) (habitat destruction is a
harm).
144 Karkkainen, supra note 113, at 59 n.312.
145 H.R. REP. No. 97-835.
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taries") to issue incidental take permits.146 The Secretaries
charged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and
the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS)14 7 with the duty
of carrying out the permitting process. The requirements for
these permits are laid out in section 10(a) of the ESA.148 The
NMFS and the FWS (the Services) may issue permits that allow
an applicant to engage in an otherwise prohibited "taking" of an
endangered species under certain circumstances.
Section 10 of the ESA is triggered when it is determined that
an activity on non-federal land149 is likely to result in the "take"
of a listed species. The landowner or project proponent must
then apply for a section 10(a)(1)(B) Incidental Take Permit. The
next step of the analysis is to determine whether the project can
be undertaken without resulting in harm to listed species. If the
Services find that harm to listed species cannot be avoided, they
recommend that applicants obtain a section 10 permit. 150 It is
ultimately up to the applicant to decide whether to apply for a
permit, the Services merely issue recommendations. If an appli-
cant does not obtain a permit and a take does indeed occur, how-
ever, the individuals responsible for the take of a listed species
will be subject to the enforcement provisions of the ESA, which
have potential penalties including fines, injunctions, and jail time.
To obtain permits, property owners must submit an HCP, a
comprehensive conservation plan. Both the Services and the
public review the proposed HCP before a permit is issued. For
an applicant to qualify for an Incidental Take Permit, the Ser-
146 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1988).
147 Now called NOAA fisheries.
148 Id. § 1539(a).
149 Federal activity or activity on non-federal land requiring a federal permit usu-
ally triggers section 7, not section 9, procedures. UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE
SERVICE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN HANDBOOK 1-4 (Nov. 1996) [hereinafter
HCP HANDBOOK]. All federal projects are subject to section 7 consultations. In
some cases, however, federal agencies besides FWS or NMFS may be integrally in-
volved in HCP efforts. In these cases, the HCP process is usually done in conjunc-
tion with section 7 actions. This allows the Services to conduct one formal
consultation that incorporates the actions for the HCP and any related federal ac-
tions into one biological opinion. The biological opinion developed for the HCP
incorporates the necessary biological analysis on the federal action as well as the
actions in the HCP to help eliminate duplication. Thus, a single biological opinion
issued by the Services addresses both the federal action and the non-federal action;
it includes an incidental take statement which authorizes any incidental take by the
federal agency and an incidental take permit, which authorizes any incidental take
by the section 10 permittee.
150 Id. at 1-4.
Exacted Conservation Easements
vices must ensure that the take will truly be incidental to an oth-
erwise lawful activity. Additionally, the HCP must mitigate the
impacts of the take "to the maximum extent practicable."15' The
applicant must show that she has funding for the plan, and the
take must not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival of
the species as a whole. Because HCPs generally offer greater
certainty for protection of species habitat than taking no action,
they are unlikely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of species
survival in the wild.' 52
Because HCPs are binding plans for an area, they usually in-
clude more than just specific discussions of one species. Con-
gress intended that the plans also include consideration of
candidate species and fragile ecosystems. This broader scope is
more beneficial to both the protected ecosystems and to the de-
velopers. By considering species not yet listed, a developer cre-
ates protection for his projects in case a species becomes listed in
the future. 53 Thus, HCPs can be valuable tools for preservation
by creating conservation plans covering whole ecosystems and
multiple species, while providing landowners and developers
with a greater degree of certainty as to future obligations.
Congress modeled section 10 and the HCP program after crea-
tive endeavors occurring on San Bruno Mountain in San Mateo
County, California during the early 1980s. 154 The San Bruno
Mountain HCP was negotiated before section 10 was in place. It
could not go into effect because there was no allowance for inci-
dental takes in the ESA. Congress added section 10 specifically
to enable the San Bruno agreement to proceed. Further, Con-
gress explained that the San Bruno agreement should serve as a
model for future HCPs.155
The issuance of an Incidental Take Permit triggers section 7 of
the ESA. Section 7(a)(2) requires all federal agencies, in consul-
tation with the Services, to ensure that any action "authorized,
funded, or carried out" by any such agency "is not likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifi-
cation" of critical habitat. 156 This process, known as section 7
151 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii).
152 HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 149, at 1-6 to 1-7.
153 Id. at 1-2.
154 Id.
155 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807.
156 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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consultation, includes detailed requirements for scientific in-
quiry. Although the requirements of sections 7 and 10 are rela-
tively similar, the triggering of section 7 adds a few new elements.
Specifically, the Services must examine indirect effects, effects on
federally listed plants, and effects on designated critical habitat.
HCPs and Incidental Take Permits were not used extensively
until the Clinton administration. Partly because both the FWS
and NMFS were slow to write and issue implementing regula-
tions for the provision,157 only three HCPs were adopted be-
tween 1982 and 1989.158 In the 1990s, Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbitt decided to use the tool to its full potential. 159
Within four years, over one hundred permits were issued.160 To-
day, more than thirty million acres are covered by over four hun-
dred HCPs."'
Support for HCPs is mixed. Some environmentalists worry
that HCPs are being developed without clear scientific guidance
and that they lock the public into a contract with a private prop-
erty owner that might not actually be beneficial to the species in
question. 62 In particular, some scholars worry that HCPs are in-
adequately funded and monitored. 163  Other environmentalists
are not quite as skeptical; they see the potential of HCPs to in-
157 The FWS published its final regulations for implementing the section 10 permit
program in the Federal Register on September 30, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 39681, 39691
(Sept. 30, 1985). NMFS published final regulations for the program on May 18,
1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 20603 (May 18, 1990). Even after the Services issued their regu-
lations, there was a lot of uncertainty about how to proceed. This led to the publica-
tion of the HCP Handbook in 1996.
158 NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 107, at 286. The first HCP was litigated in the
well-known Jantzen case. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d
976 (9th Cir. 1985).
159 Karkkainen, supra note 113, at 59; Press Release, Department of Interior,
Habitat Conservation Planning Is Streamlined Under New Guidelines Announced
By Two Agencies (Dec. 3, 1996), available at http://daewin.eeb.uconn.edu/ docu-
ments/fws-960916.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
160 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Habitat Conservation Plans and Agreements
Database, at http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv-plans/public.jsp (last visited Jan. 19, 2005)
(showing listings for all HCPs, Safe Harbor Plans, and Candidate Conservation
Agreements).
161 As of March 8, 2005, 479 Habitat Conservation Plans have been approved,
covering over 38 million acres and protecting more than 526 species. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Planning, at http://en-
dangered.fws.gov/hcp/index.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2005).
162 Michael Lipske, Giving Rare Creatures a Fighting Chance, NAT'L WILDLIFE
(Feb./March 1998).
163 See, e.g., Thomas Douglas Feldman, Local Solutions to Land Use Conflict
Under the ESA: Habitat Conservation Planning in Riverside County (1995) (un-
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crease habitat protection' 64 and to make the ESA less vulnerable
to attack by conservatives and private property rights advocates.
HCPs are very attractive to policy-makers because they help alle-
viate some of the criticisms of the ESA. The increased flexibility
allows private landowners to make changes to their land. Private
landowners are generally in favor of HCPs because HCPs allow
them to develop land that otherwise seemed unavailable due to
the presence of endangered species. However, HCPs still re-
present an obstacle for developers. Although the goal of HCPs is
to increase flexibility, the HCP requirement imposes a cumber-
some process on developers. The lengthy permitting process im-
poses direct costs on developers and causes building delays,
which further increase costs. 165 Some scholars and landowners
view the prohibitions of section 9 and the permitting process of
section 10 as examples of the increasing interference of federal
government with local decisions. 66 Because local land use con-
trol is a function traditionally left to state and local governments,
the HCP requirements, which impose a federal planning process
on private land with endangered species, can be viewed as an
infringement on local sovereignty.
A lack of adequate scientific understanding of species and
their habitat makes HCPs uncertain documents. They are essen-
tially long-term contracts binding on both parties-but it is diffi-
cult to know when HCPs are really doing the "right thing" for
listed species. It is not clear what type of mitigation really works
best. There are few studies showing whether HCPs have actually
been successful in terms of species recovery and rehabilitation.
As one scholar noted, "[g]ranting permits based on inaccurate or
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Riverside) (on file at the
University of California at Riverside University Library).
164 The National Wildlife Federation argues that the plans work well as long as
safeguards are in place. Press Release, National Wildlife Federation, U.S. District
Court Ruling In California Will Improve Wildlife Safeguards Nationwide (Aug. 16,
2000), available at http://www.swainsonshank.org/Natomas%20Victory.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2005). The National Audubon Society has criticized the current state
of HCPs, but believes that there is potential for improvements in habitat protection
with changes in the current implementation procedures. The National Audubon So-
ciety, Report of the National Audubon Society Task Force on Habitat Conservation
Plans (1995), available at http://www.audubon.org/ campaign/esa/taskjorce.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2005)..
165 Bernstein, supra note 118, at 1343-44.
166 See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats:
The Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10
STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 2 (1991).
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incomplete information about an ecosystem could result in spe-
cies decimation, which would thwart the goals of the ESA.'31
67
Habitat modification could harm an unknown or unlisted spe-
cies-unforeseen and unforeseeable impacts could disrupt an en-
tire ecosystem.
In 1998, the agencies that enforce the ESA adopted a "No Sur-
prises" rule. 168 This rule provides security for landowners. Once
an HCP is agreed to, landowners will not be penalized if a spe-
cies "unexpectedly worsens due to unforeseen circumstances.'
169
This "No Surprises" provision is even more upsetting to environ-
mentalists than the original Incidental Take Permit provision.
With uncertainty in the conservation biology of endangered spe-
cies and unknown potential ecosystem effects, HCPs can never
take into account all potentialities. Additionally, scientists agree
that adaptive management and ecosystem level programs provide
the best protection for species and their habitat. A locked-in
agreement between the federal government and a property
owner prevents future changes to the management of particular
parcels as knowledge about a species or ecosystem increases.170
A. Types of HCPs
An HCP must assess the impact of the proposed activity on
listed species, analyze alternatives to the proposed activity, set
out the steps that will be taken to minimize the impact, and de-
scribe the funding that will be available to implement such
steps. 171 The Secretaries may approve the HCP and issue an In-
cidental Take Permit if the Secretaries find that the taking will
not "appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recov-
ery of the species in the wild.' 1 72 The federal agencies charged
with administering the ESA interpret this requirement to mean
that a species may be incidentally taken unless the taking threat-
167 Bernstein, supra note 118, at 1344.
168 Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
8859 (Feb 23, 1998).
169 Id. at 8867.
170 The spotted owl serves as a good example of the problems of scientific uncer-
tainty. The owl was largely unstudied before Eric Forsman began his graduate work
in the forests of the Pacific Northwest in the 1980s. Each time a study on the raptors
was released, the estimated critical habitat requirements changed. See generally
STEPHEN L. YZFEE, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OWL: POLIcY LESSONS FOR A
NEW CENTURY (1994).
171 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
172 Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
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ens to diminish the species' survival and recovery chances. Thus,
a project can harm individuals of a species as long as it does not
imperil the survival of the species as a whole. Some environmen-
talists and scholars argue that Incidental Take Permits allow
landowners to harm species in ways that could jeopardize the ex-
istence of the species.' 73 With an increasing number of HCPs
being approved, scholars and conservationists now worry about
the potential cumulative impacts of all these plans.'74
In a typical HCP, a landowner has immediate plans to do
something on her land that would harm a listed species. In ex-
change for permission to carry out this harm-causing activity, the
landowner must prepare a plan to mitigate the harm of the pro-
posed activity. In these situations, the listed species is already
present on the property.
HCPs generally take one of two forms: project specific or re-
gional. Project specific HCPs generally cover less land area and
are put together by a developer. The developer hires consultants
to write the HCP, which must meet the approval of the FWS.
The developer is personally responsible for finding conservation
easements in this case.
The developer can either purchase conservation easements
from a landowner whose land has suitable habitat characteristics
or place a conservation easement on his own land. In these
cases, although the developer is involved in the process of creat-
ing the conservation easement, he quickly divorces himself from
the encumbrance. When the developer donates a conservation
easement on his own land, it is common for him to sell the under-
lying fee interest. 175 The conservation easement becomes part of
the cost of doing business. Once the conservation easement is
purchased and turned over to an appropriate entity, the devel-
oper is no longer involved in the conservation easement process.
Although developers are generally required by their permit
terms to provide some upfront money to fund monitoring and
enforcement, developers do not play an active role in either the
monitoring or enforcement. The developer does not usually hold
the conservation easement or the underlying fee title. The agree-
ment is between the easement holder and the fee title landowner.
Developers thus successfully remove themselves from the situa-
173 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 105, at 200.
174 See, e.g., id. at 201.
175 See supra note 81.
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tion after they have provided the money for the conservation
easement creation or donation and a cash payment for enforce-
ment and monitoring.1 76
With regional HCPs, the developer is even further removed
from the conservation easement process. When HCPs are re-
gional, it is usually a city or county that puts together the HCP.
The regional administrator, for example a county, is then respon-
sible for finding and purchasing conservation easements. The re-
gional administrator can hold on to the easements, but generally
passes them on to local land trusts or state agencies. In Califor-
nia, for example, many conservation easements on wetlands are
held by the California Department of Fish and Game. 177 In such
cases, developers merely provide the funding for the conserva-
tion easements. The cost of purchasing, monitoring, and enforc-
ing easements comes in the form of a fee paid by the developer
when applying for a permit to undertake a project. Once again,
the developer is generally disconnected from the easement.
B. Reviewability of HCPs
ESA and HCP regulations provide for limited public review of
HCPs. The Services currently require a thirty-day public com-
ment period for all formal HCP applications, but generally ex-
pand the comment period to sixty days for large-scale HCPs.178
Generally, the Services publish notices about the availability of
HCPs in local newspapers and hold informational meetings. 179
Because the development of an HCP is the responsibility of an
applicant and not a government agency, there is no requirement
that the public be involved in the creation of an HCP. However,
the Services do encourage applicants for larger or more contro-
versial projects to provide opportunities for public involve-
ment. 8 ° Indeed, most HCPs are the result of negotiation and
cooperation between many participants including community
176 Nancy McLaughlin refers to these costs as transaction costs. The developer
pays the cost of writing the deeds, hiring the lawyers, and providing the land trust
with funding for administration. McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 24.
177 California Department of Fish & Game Website, http://www.dfg.ca.gbv (last
visited Feb. 15, 2004).
178 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE / NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD-
MINISTRATION. ADDENDUM TO THE HCP HANDBOOK, Executive Summary (May
2000).
179 Id.
180 Id.
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members, non-profit organizations, project proponents, and rep-
resentatives from all levels of government. 181
HCPs are subject to public review under the requirements of
the ESA and under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). The issuance of a section 10 permit is a federal action
subject to NEPA requirements. Although many section 10 re-
quirements overlap with NEPA requirements, NEPA goes fur-
ther than the ESA, requiring consideration of environmental
impacts beyond species and habitat impacts. A NEPA analysis
must also include, for example, examinations of impacts on air
and water quality. Depending on the scope of an HCP, NEPA
compliance requires a categorical exemption, an Environmental
Assessment, or an Environmental Impact Statement.
Groups and individuals that can show standing can bring legal
challenges to the granting of Incidental Take Permits. In fact, a
group named Friends of Endangered Species challenged the very
first Incidental Take Permit ever issued.182 Challenges to permits
are in essence challenges to agency decisions. Thus, the cases are
rooted in the administrative law drawing largely on the APA.
The APA and judicial precedents have established a strong level
of deference to agency action and decision-making.'83 Chal-
lenges to the issuance of Incidental Take Permits necessarily in-
clude a review of the HCPs, and usually include a review of the
biological data collected and presented within the context of sec-
tion 7 of the ESA. Although such challenges can result in a revo-
cation of a permit or a change in permit terms, these are not suits
based upon enforcement of a permit.
HCPs cannot be challenged by ballot referendums. In San
Bruno, local citizens tried to challenge an amendment to an HCP
via referendum. Although they garnered enough signatures to
qualify the issue for the ballot, a court held that an HCP amend-
181 For example, the San Bruno HCP was constructed based on the input of repre-
sentatives from housing developments, landowners, "prospective developers, [San
Mateo] County, the cities of Brisbane, Daly City, and South San Francisco, the Cali-
fornia Department of Fish and Game, the FWS," and a citizens' environmental
group called the Committee to Save San Bruno Mountain. Arnold, supra note 166,
at 20. This assortment of participants, although large, is typical for HCPs.
182 Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
183 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2003); Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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ment is an administrative act and therefore not subject to
referendum. 184
C. Enforcement of HCPs
The Services are responsible for enforcement of HCPs. If the
terms of an HCP are not being complied with, the Services
should bring enforcement actions against the permit holder. Fail-
ure to comply with an HCP is essentially a violation of a federal
permit. Federal agencies are the only entities that can bring ac-
tions against permit holders.185
IV
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN HCPs
Conservation easements created to meet HCP requirements
are a form of exacted conservation easements. This means,
among other things, that the developers who are providing the
funding for purchasing, monitoring, and enforcing conservation
easements are not eligible for the tax breaks that accompany
conservation easements undertaken for other reasons. The de-
velopers are required to assist in the creation of conservation
easements; therefore, the conservation easements are not created
in the same spirit as conservation easements that qualify as chari-
table donations.
A. Coerced Conservation Easements
1. No Tax Breaks for Charitable Contributions
Conservation easements created in conjunction with permits
do not qualify as charitable donations. Other elements of the
conservation easements are generally the same. A landowner is
placing a restriction on land that detracts from the marketability
and commercial value of the land. However, in the case of ex-
acted conservation easements, the landowner is not really as-
signing away a right he had. Because of the presence of either
listed species or habitat, the land could not have been developed
anyway. Viewed in this way, however, the landowner is not re-
184 W.W. Dean & Assoc. v. City of San Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368 (1987).
185 Although some environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions allowing
private individuals and groups to act as private attorneys general and bring enforce-
ment actions, the ESA does not contain a provision specifically allowing for citizen
enforcement of Incidental Take Permits,
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ally giving away any rights, and perhaps the restriction should
not be termed a conservation easement-it is merely a codifica-
tion of a restriction already present because of ESA require-
ments. However, it is significant that the restrictions embodied
in conservation easements are usually in perpetuity. This means
that regardless of changes in species make-up, habitat ranges, cli-
mate changes, or even greater understanding of the conservation
biology of the species, the land can never be developed.186 If a
conservation easement is created to protect a species that later
goes extinct, the extinction does not automatically change the re-
striction on the land. Taking into account these long-term re-
strictions, the landowner has indeed lost a significant
opportunity. The denial of tax incentives may not be clearly jus-
tified. Examination of the motivations of conservation easement
donors does not necessarily reveal incentives that are any purer
than those of developers required to purchase a conservation
easement based on permit terms.
Perhaps tax incentives should be available to landowners and
developers in conjunction with conservation easements that are
born out of HCPs. Scholars have found federal tax policy a use-
ful incentive for accommodating species preservation. It makes
sense to draw upon tax incentives to encourage species and
habitat protection because the tax system is already in place, the
tax code reaches everyone, and legislators commonly use the tax
code to stimulate or shape investment and development
decisions.187
2. Property Tax and Estate Tax Breaks Should Still be
Available
Even if a charitable tax deduction is not available, there could
still be property tax breaks available to landowners who are re-
quired to create conservation easements in conjunction with per-
186 Although these exacted conservation easements are technically in perpetuity
and generally last a "long time," there are ways for conservation easements to end
whether by merger, laches, or changed circumstances. Courts are generally reluc-
tant to terminate easements, but it does happen. A discussion of easement termina-
tion is outside the scope of this Article, but there are some helpful texts available.
See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 2, at 482-94; Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions
on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002); Jeffrey A.
Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1989).
187 Brown, supra note 105, at 247.
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mits. If a conservation easement reduces the value of land, the
land should be taxed at a lower rate. However, if the conserva-
tion easement is on land that provides habitat for endangered
species, the land would not be developable even without the con-
servation easement. Therefore, even before the creation of the
easement, the land would have had a reduced fair market value
and thus, reduced property and estate tax liability. When devel-
opers place conservation easements on their own land, they gen-
erally get rid of the underlying fee title soon thereafter. Thus,
the new owner of the fee simple land would be the one that gets
the lower property taxes and accompanying benefits in exchange
for purchasing encumbered land.
Increasing the tax credit for such lands could increase the ben-
efit of owning and protecting rare habitat. Whenever conserva-
tion easements are violated, the property tax benefits should
disappear, thereby encouraging landowners to be honest.'
There may still be some available tax advantages associated
with the burdens of the current estate tax. This is only an advan-
tage to a project proponent who is also a landowner. When the
fee simple title to land burdened by an easement is held by an
outside party, that party gets the benefit of lower property val-
ues. This benefit could be magnified, however. There are cur-
rently additional estate tax benefits when an easement applies to
certain categories of land. 89 Because preservation of endan-
gered species habitat is a public good, the additional tax benefits
should also apply to this land.
B. Major Concerns
1. Dead Hand
One of the most common concerns about conservation ease-
ments relates to the fear of "dead hand control" over land. Con-
servation easements give an extraordinary amount of power to
the present day landowner who negotiates the original deal re-
stricting future owners and managers. Thus, conservation ease-
ments may be overshadowed by a fear of one generation creating
long-term obligations and imposing their views far into the fu-
ture. This so called "dead hand control" has led to laws against
188 See id. at 247-49 (discussing state and local property tax credits). Of course,
this assumes that someone is monitoring the HCPs and adjusting the property values
accordingly, an action that is unlikely to occur.
189 See supra text accompanying note 7.
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perpetuities and other efforts to diminish the amount of control
one owner's wishes can have far into the future. Some scholars
find this dead hand argument "ironic" when the alternative to
conservation easements is often development and habitat restric-
tion, which has a much greater capacity to impose dead hand
control over land.' 9° Worries about dead hand control take on a
different tone when discussed in relation to exacted conservation
easements. Here, the hand controlling the land is not clearly the
private landowner; the government also plays an important role.
Although present day actions restrict future flexibility with re-
gard to the land, the involvement of land use and environmental
law statutes imbues the decision with public policy goals.
2. Change of Circumstance
Connected to concerns of the dead hand are potential
problems associated with changed circumstances. Conservation
easements placed on land today may not always make sense in
the future. For example, neighboring land may be developed-
making scenic and environmental quality easements less benefi-
cial. In the case of conservation easements to protect habitat,
species may go extinct-making protection of their habitat less
critical. Alternatively, species may recover to such an extent that
preserving a few acres may no longer be important. The best
conservation easements try to take into account future events
and incorporate potentialities. Some conservation easement
agreements do have provisions for release of the easement and
clauses about changes of circumstances. However, for HCP miti-
gation proposals, the easements should be in perpetuity; there-
fore, no change of circumstance clauses should allow landowners
to break their easement contracts.
3. Enforcement and Monitoring is Uncertain
Some scholars worry that land trusts will spend their energies
securing conservation easements without thinking thoroughly
about enforcement."' Many holders of conservation easements
are small groups who do not have the resources or expertise to
implement projects adequate to protect biodiversity. Although
190 Farrier, supra note 67, at 344 ("Such an argument is ironic in the current envi-
ronmental context, where non-sustainable development is responsible for reducing
the choices available to future generations.").
191 See, e.g., id.
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the government often provides funding for purchasing conserva-
tion easements, there are usually not funds set aside for enforce-
ment duties.192
Land trusts may not have the necessary staff and infrastructure
to manage conservation easements. According to the Land Trust
Alliance, 40 percent of all regional land trusts are staffed entirely
by volunteers. 193 A recent survey in the San Francisco Bay area
examined 315 conservation easements and found forty-three vio-
lations. 194 There were more violations on conservation ease-
ments managed by land trusts compared to conservation
easements owned by public entities, but this is most likely be-
cause private groups were more diligent in their enforcement and
thus, more likely to find violations. 195
Many of the large land trusts become so entrenched in their
business and working with the landowners that they overlook
transgressions.1 96 The Nature Conservancy focuses on maintain-
ing good relationships with landholders to prevent easement
transgressions. 197 Monitoring land encumbered by easements is
not always an easy task. To secure compliance with a conserva-
tion easement agreement, a land trust must monitor the encum-
bered land, which can take time for both the easement holder
and the landowner. For example, The Nature Conservancy en-
forces their conservation easements at the ACE Basin in Florida
by walking through the property with the landowner each year;
the Conservancy asserts to having no problems with enforcement
even when the property has changed hands.' 98 However, chang-
ing ownership seems likely to lead to increased easement viola-
192 Id. at 348-49.
193 Land Trust Alliance, About Land Trusts, at http://www.lta.org (last visited Jan.
19, 2005).
194 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 391; see also Cheever, supra note 2, at 1100; BAY
AREA OPEN SPACE COUNCIL, ENSURING THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATION EASE-
MENTS (1999).
195 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 391. Around 75 percent of land trusts monitored
their easements regularly while only 30 percent of public entities did.
196 This is one of the justifications for the new Huey Johnson (founder of Trust for
Public Lands) organization, Defense of Place. Defense of Place is the first of what
promises to be several new organizations serving as a watchdog of conservation
easement holders working through legal and non-legal channels to try to ensure
easement agreements are upheld. Defense of Place, About Defense of Place, at
http://defenseofplace.rri.org/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); see also
Farrier, supra note 67, at 349-50.
197 Farrier, supra note 67, at 350.
198 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 413.
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tions and enforcement concerns. A recent Land Trust Alliance
study indicates that all 435 serious conservation easement viola-
tions in 1999 were committed by post-transaction owners.1 99 To
provide funding for enforcement, many land trusts have begun to
charge easement defense fees to entities, such as governments,
that are donating easements to them.2°
Conservation easements are legal mechanisms that can be en-
forced in the courts, but formal proceedings are seen as a last
resort.2 °1 Without vigilant easement holders, who are willing to
pursue enforcement in the courts, the mechanism loses its power.
Essentially, the public is a co-owner of many easements and
should be able to insist that obligations are upheld. 2  Unfortu-
nately, only some states allow third-party enforcement actions.20 3
Often, the attorney general of a state and the holder of the ease-
ments are the only ones who can bring court challenges °.2 4 These
options are discussed further in the next section of this Article.
The more complex the conservation easement agreement, the
more difficult it may be to monitor and enforce the terms of the
contract. 0 5 Sometimes it is just plain difficult to determine that
the terms of an easement are not being complied with. For ex-
ample, some natural changes in land may resemble changes re-
sulting from poor management or changes in farming
techniques. 0 6
4. Accountability
Because conservation easements are often held, monitored,
and enforced by private organizations there is no direct political
accountability. Enforcement of the ESA is the responsibility of
the federal government. Thus, the public should be able to hold
the political branches accountable for the enforcement of the
ESA and attaining the goals of the ESA. This does not happen
easily when the ESA is enforced through conservation easements
held by private organizations. Some scholars assert that the or-
199 Land Trust Alliance, Easement Violations 1999, at http://www.lta.org.
20 0 DIEHL & BARRETr, supra note 1, at 104.
201 Id. at 92.
202 McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 470-71.
203 Generally, these are the states that have substantially adopted the UCEA.
Morrisette, supra note 7, at 389.
204 Id.
205 See Boyd et al., supra note 98, at 215.
206 Id.
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ganizations are indeed accountable to the public."0 7 As non-
profit public charitable organizations, they are subject to review
by state attorneys general.
5. Long Term Protection is Actually Uncertain
Most easement violations happen when the underlying prop-
erty changes hands.2 °8 Subsequent property owners do not al-
ways have the same motivation to protect species, and they might
not fully understand the requirements of the conservation ease-
ment agreements. Additionally, subsequent landowners some-
times bring challenges against conservation easements in
court.20 9 So far, there have been few conservation easement
cases, but the courts have shown a strong tendency to enforce the
terms of these easements.2 10 Conservation easements are "a
form of 'shared' ownership of land."'2 1' This means that the long-
term viability of these agreements depends on how the conserva-
tion easement agreements can anticipate and incorporate poten-
tial future conflicts and changes amongst owners. Such
conservation easements can be difficult to draft.
C. Special Enforceability Concerns With Conservation
Easements in HCPs
The biggest concern with conservation easements within HCPs
is enforcement.212 It is not clear who has the right to enforce the
20 7 FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 52, at 153.
208 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
209 For an in-depth discussion of these types of challenges, including both the stat-
utory and common law principles on which they rest, see Cheever, supra note 2, at
1093-1101.
210 Morrisette, supra note 7, at 390.
211 Boyd et al., supra note 98, at 219.
212 Throughout this section and the remainder of the Article, I work under the
assumption that the conservation easements exacted to meet the terms of a federal
permit are valid under the operating state conservation easement statutes. This is
not an obvious or trivial assumption for a few reasons. First, conservation easement
statutes do not usually explicitly address the special category of exacted conserva-
tion easements. The contemplated conservation easements appear to be donated
ones (and sometimes sold easements). The legislative history behind the UCEA
reveals no discussion of conservation easements created by exaction. (I thank Mary
Ann King and her legislative history research of the UCEA for this information.)
Second, state conservation easement statutes may have provisions that specifically
conflict with the goals of the ESA (e.g., one must allow access, or hunting, or even
mining). A similar conflict arose in United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1974), where the FWS negotiated easements that conflicted with state common law.
North Dakota, the site of the challenged easements, did not have a conservation
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terms of a conservation easement bargained for under the ESA.
Generally, a conservation easement is like a contract between
the owner of the land encumbered by an easement and the
holder of the easement. In the cases of HCP exacted conserva-
tion easements, these two entities could be individuals or groups
that had nothing to do with the HCP process. HCPs are part of
the ESA. They aim to protect threatened and endangered spe-
cies because Congress has identified that aim as an important
goal for America. The desire to protect species is strong enough
to stop large federal projects that have been underway for years
and in which millions of dollars have been invested. Addition-
ally, despite protests by private landowners, Congress has de-
clined to revoke the ESA. Essentially, these background facts
point to the conclusion that Congress meant what it said when it
passed the ESA. The protection of threatened and endangered
species is paramount. The American public has an interest in
preserving endangered species for both biocentric and anthro-
pocentic reasons. By extension, the public also has an interest in
HCPs. Federal money is used in the creation of HCPs, and this
money should be going to projects where species are being pro-
tected and where the federal government has some type of moni-
toring and enforcement power. Without clear enforcement
mechanisms, it is unclear what happens when landowners do not
adhere to the terms of the conservation easements encumbering
their lands.
The desire to make sure that conservation easements are being
enforced is clear, but how to enforce them is not. There are
three key questions: (1) who has the right to bring an enforce-
ment action?; (2) who should the action be brought against?; and
(3) what form should the enforcement action take? The basic
conservation easement framework and language tell us that the
holders of easements have the authority to enforce them. As de-
easements statute when that case was tried. There, the Eighth Circuit held that state
property law would not disrupt the federally-negotiated and federally-held ease-
ments. In essence, federal law superseded the conflicting state law. It is not clear if
courts would be equally deferential to conservation easements arising under a fed-
eral statute but held by a state or private entity. Third, conservation easements that
are invalid under state conservation easements statutes follow state common law
regarding servitudes introducing an additional set of enforcement concerns. These
complexities are interesting and should be explored further, but for purposes of pur-
suing the narrow question at hand, I assume here that the exacted conservation
easements operating in conjunction with the ESA are valid under state conservation
easement statutes and save the further questions for another day.
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scribed above, these easement holders are generally land trusts
and government agencies. Many of the land trusts are small local
groups potentially lacking capacity, accountability, and experi-
ence in managing conservation easements and monitoring endan-
gered species habitat. What if the land trust chooses not to
enforce because of a desire to avoid ill-will in a community? A
decision not to enforce could be a strategic decision to focus the
organization's energies elsewhere. What if it simply does not
have the capacity to monitor the land to realize when enforce-
ment actions are necessary? Essentially the question becomes:
what do we do when an easement holder is not doing its job?
The outlook is not much better when government agencies serve
as conservation easement holders. Government agencies are also
often faced with budget constraints that may infringe upon their
ability to diligently monitor the easements they hold. In the ab-
sence of enforcement by the easement holder, it is not clear who
has the right to bring an action against an easement holder or a
negligent landowner. This lack of clarity is especially troubling in
light of the use of conservation easements in conjunction with
federal environmental laws. Because HCP easements are pro-
tecting endangered species habitat, and thus our common heri-
tage, it is vital that either public or federal routes of enforcement
remain open.
1. Who Can Bring a Conservation Easement Enforcement
Action?
As well as defining the rights transferred to the easement
holder, the text of conservation easements generally "establish
the means of enforcement for division and transfer of rights. '213
These enforcement rights are usually vested solely in the ease-
ment holder, with some exceptions that will be discussed below.
When the text of the conservation easement does not identify
enforcement possibilities beyond the easement holder, it is un-
clear who else has the right to bring an enforcement action. This
section describes the different possible groups who could bring
actions to enforce exacted conservation easements.
213 Boyd et al., supra note 98, at 220.
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a. Conservation Easement Holders
For a conservation easement to be effective, the government
agency or non-profit organization holding the exacted conserva-
tion easement must be committed to monitoring the use of the
land and protecting the conservation purpose of the easement in
perpetuity. A conservation easement is a contractual relation-
ship between a landowner and an easement holder. Easement
holders have the responsibility of both monitoring and enforcing
the agreement. Their ability to enforce the easement is clearly
detailed in the conservation easement provisions and often
clearly delineated by state law. It is clear that easement holders
are able to enforce the conditions of the easement because that is
the essence of the property right that they have gained as holders
of conservation easements.
b. Attorneys General
The real issue is what happens when the holder of an easement
falls down on the job for one reason or another and does not
enforce the terms of the conservation easement. Because the job
of enforcing these agreements often rests with a private organiza-
tion, it is important that the right of enforcement be given to an
organization with a demonstrably strong environmental interest.
Even so, problems may occur.
The directors of conservation organizations are generally held
to a standard of care similar to that for directors of private corpo-
rations. Thus, directors "must perform their duties in good faith,
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise"
were they in a similar situation.214 Directors are expected to act
in the best interests of their corporation. In most states, the at-
torney general has powers over charitable institutions that give
her the right to enforce an easement when an easement holder is
not meeting its obligations.215 In Washington D.C., only the
United States Attorney is vested with the power and discretion
to bring suit against a director of a conservation agency. 1 6 Be-
cause this power is discretionary, however, the United States At-
torney and state attorneys general cannot be compelled to bring
an action. Thus, if a private organization or individual discovers
214 Id. at 230.
215 DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 1, at 115.
216 Boyd et al., supra note 98, at 230-31; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-425 (1997-1998).
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a violation, that person can bring the violation to the attention of
the United States Attorney or the state attorney general, but
there is no basis for independent enforcement.
c. Department of the Interior
It seems fundamental that the Departments of Commerce and
the Interior must have the right to enforce an HCP and any per-
mit terms. As the issuers of Incidental Take Permits, they have
both the right and obligation to make sure that permit terms are
being complied with. The language in HCPs regarding conserva-
tion easements tends to be vague. Sometimes HCPs just make
passing references to conservation easements. For example, the
Metropolitan Bakersfield Habitat Conservation Plan merely lists
conservation easements as a planning tool that may be availa-
ble.217 HCPs generally state that there will be conservation ease-
ments that meet the approval of the Service.
There is usually nothing in an HCP mentioning enforcement of
conservation easements in particular, but there are often broad
statements in HCPs or their implementation agreements declar-
ing that nothing in the HCP will create a third-party beneficiary
or any interest in the public. 18 FWS and DOI lawyers, however,
are now beginning to require easements to contain provisions al-
lowing for DOI enforcement of the agreements. 219  These
changes represent an acknowledgement of potential future en-
forcement issues. This change was needed because without any
clarifying language, the rights of the public may be left in the
217 METROPOLITAN BAKERSFIELD HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN STEERING
COMMITTEE, METROPOLITAN BAKERSFIELD HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 83
(April 1994) (on file with author).
218 See, e.g., UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, ET AL. IMPLEMENTA-
TION/MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT REGARDING THE METROPOLITAN BAKERSFIELD
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 24 (April 1994) ("Urban Development Permittees
are intended Beneficiaries.. .. None of the rights or benefits created by this Agree-
ment shall inure to or benefit any person other than the identified parties herein...
except as may be provided pursuant to the ESA .... "); KERN WATER BANK Au-
THORITY, KERN WATER BANK HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN/NATURAL COMMU-
NITY CONSERVATION PLAN 71 (May 1997) (on file with author) ("This Agreement is
solely for the benefit of the [Kern Water Bank Authority], the Department [of the
Interior] and the [United States Fish & Wildlife] Service. The Parties intend that
only the Parties to this Agreement and their approved Assignees shall benefit from
the Agreement. This Agreement shall not create in the public, any member of the
public, any other person or entity ... any rights as a third-party beneficiary to this
Agreement.").
219 Interview with Heidi Crowell, Staff Attorney for the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Ser-
vice, Red Bluff Office (Nov. 10, 2003) (notes on file with author).
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hands of local land trusts. Although there have not yet been any
examples of enforcement problems brought to court, both con-
servation easements and HCPs are relatively young and it would
not be surprising to see these problems develop in the future.
d. Members of the Public
In some states, local citizens can sue to enforce a conservation
easement. In California, for example, the California Open Space
Easements Act of 1969 allows property owners and local re-
sidents to enforce open space easements if the city or county
holding the easement fails to enforce or honor the restrictions.22 °
In Florida, water management districts often hold conservation
easements associated with wetlands.22 State law explicitly binds
the water districts to their duties under easement agreements. If
a district fails to sufficiently monitor or enforce a conservation
easement, a third party with demonstrated environmental inter-
ests in the property subject to the easement can obtain an admin-
istrative hearing to challenge the district's inaction.22 These
statutes are not uniform across the country, and even the Florida
and California statutes do not necessarily cover conservation
easements that are part of Incidental Take Permits.
2. Who Should Conservation Easement Enforcement Actions
Be Brought Against?
Because so many parties are involved in creating HCPs and
their corresponding conservation easements, it is not clear whom
to ultimately hold responsible when things go awry. A permit
holder is usually responsible for permit compliance, but here the
real violator is usually the owner of the land encumbered by the
conservation easement, which may or may not be the permit
holder. This section examines the different parties against whom
enforcement actions could be brought.
a. The Current Landowner
Landowners and occupants have the most direct control over a
property's condition. Conservation easements give the responsi-
bility for enforcement and monitoring to groups who have more
incentive to enforce, but less direct control, and therefore, an im-
220 CAL. GoV'T CODE § 51058 (West 2005).
221 FLA. STAT. ch. 259.101(8) (1998).
222 See Boyd et al., supra note 98, at 232.
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paired ability to access information. Undisputedly, the person or
entity occupying the land should have both the best information
about activities on the land and be in the best place to influence
land management. Conservation easements should acknowledge
this relationship and place responsibility for degradation
squarely on the landowner. Thus, we should give more leeway to
the easement holders; if they miss or overlook an infringement
that should not be license for the landowner to violate the
agreement.
Because landowners are the ones who are generally violating
easement conditions, it makes the most sense for enforcement
actions to be brought against them directly. The person violating
the agreement by making changes to the land that could result in
habitat modification or destruction should answer directly for his
actions. Landowners are informed about the easement restric-
tions when entering into the agreements or when purchasing land
encumbered by such restrictions.
b. Easement Holder
Because Incidental Take Permit programs involve the poten-
tial destruction of endangered species and their habitat, the pub-
lic has a strong interest in enforcement, but to whom should
people turn for redress when an easement is not being upheld?
An easement holder can bring an action against the landowner,
but can anyone bring an action against the easement holder for
not holding up her end of the bargain? Third parties should be
able to bring an action against a land trust or government agency
that is not doing the monitoring and enforcement job required by
a conservation easement. Suit against the easement holder
would be somewhat indirect though. The easement holder would
still have to commence a later action against the landowner.
Suits against easement holders would then take the form of suing
someone for not suing someone else. By the time the actions
would be settled, either in or out of court, irreparable harm could
be done to endangered species and their habitat.
c. Government Agencies
The Departments of Commerce and the Interior are charged
with administering the ESA. The DOI has taken the lead in this
area and delegated day-to-day operation to the Services. As the
administrator of the ESA, it is the DOI's responsibility to ensure
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that the ESA is being complied with, including Incidental Take
Permit holders' compliance with HCPs. Permits are conditioned
on compliance with HCPs. HCPs contain conservation ease-
ments. Therefore, a violation of a conservation easement is non-
compliance with the HCP, and a violation of the permit. If the
DOI is not working to ensure permit compliance, a suit could be
brought against the DOI for failing to do its job to enforce the
ESA. Actions against the DOI would be similarly attenuated as
those against easement holders. The DOI would still need to
take subsequent action against either the permit holder, the ease-
ment holder, or the landowner. As discussed below, it is not
clear what the DOI's potential routes of enforcement are.
d. Incidental Take Permit Holder
When conservation easements are used as permit conditions,
there is an added level of complexity. It is unclear who is respon-
sible for the enforcement of conservation easements that are per-
mit conditions. Enforcement of permit terms may include
enforcement of conservation easement terms. Perhaps the per-
mit holder should be responsible for ensuring compliance with
conservation easement terms? If the HCP is not being complied
with, perhaps it should be regarded as a per se violation of a
permit. When the permit holder is also the conservation ease-
ment violator, the case is rather straightforward-but this is not
generally the case. As described above, permit holders often
purchase conservation easements on other land. In cases where
they do place conservation easements on their own land, they
often later sell the fee simple title to the land. In the end, the
permit holder may have no direct connection to the conservation
easement or the land encumbered by it.
If developers comply with the terms of the ESA, there is a
strong argument that they should be shielded from liability. The
permits generally require developers to provide funding for the
conservation easements. If they uphold their end of the bargain,
why should they later be punished for someone else's
irresponsibility?223
Finally, actions against the permit holder may not yield the de-
sired result. Non-compliance with a permit usually means permit
223 If the developer however retains fee title to the land burdened by the exacted
conservation easement, they are clearly responsible for any infractions and should
face permit revocation and penalties for violations.
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revocation, penalties, or criminal sanctions. Such actions may do
little to obtain compliance with associated conservation ease-
ments or to protect endangered species habitat.
3. What Form Should Enforcement Actions Take?
There are two main prongs of enforcement inquiry for conser-
vation easements that are incorporated into HCPs. Because
these conservation easements are part of a federal scheme to en-
force the ESA, there should be clear federal routes of enforce-
ment based upon the ESA and the APA. If pursuing
enforcement via federal routes is undesirable, traditional state
laws concerning conservation easements could enable enforce-
ment actions by someone other than the easement holder.
a. Federal Enforcement Routes
Federal enforcement of conservation easement violations may
be desirable because it could provide a national, uniform method
of enforcement. Drawing upon the ESA and the APA would
create precedent and guidance for agencies and courts through-
out the country. In contrast, state enforcement mechanisms
would not provide uniformity. State laws on conservation ease-
ments vary widely. It is not clear what enforcement routes state
conservation easement statutes allow or how the various state
statutes would interact with federal schemes aimed at protecting
endangered species and their habitat. Because conservation
easements are part of HCPs, there could be enforcement actions
based upon the ESA. Additionally, because government agen-
cies are the enforcers and administrators of the ESA, enforce-
ment actions could be brought against them under the APA
when the agencies do not adequately perform their duties by al-
lowing conservation easements to go unenforced.
i. ESA Actions
a. Brought by the DOI
As designated administrators of the ESA, the Services should
be able to require enforcement of the ESA. Although that seems
like a non-controversial contention, it is not clear exactly how
enforcement actions would be brought, or against whom they
would be brought. The Services negotiate the permits and could
likely bring actions for violations of a permit based on the notion
[Vol. 19, 2004]
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that a violation of a conservation easement is a per se violation of
the ESA. There are some problems here though. First, if the
argument is that the permit has been violated, then the action
would be against the permit holder. As discussed above, this
may not necessarily be appropriate. The permit holder may have
been diligent in negotiating and complying with permit terms to
the best of her ability. Should the permit holder be the one held
responsible when a landowner violates the terms of one of the
conservation easements she funded? Second, conservation ease-
ments are not always clearly recorded. Although the land may
be encumbered by an exacted conservation easement, there
might not be a record connecting the conservation easement to
the HCP it was created in conjunction with.
If the DOI could show that the easement violation was result-
ing in a "take" to an endangered species, it would have a clear
basis for ESA enforcement. This would require monitoring of
the easement followed by proof that there was actual harm to an
individual species.
b. Brought by Citizens
Because the conservation easements being discussed are per-
mit conditions, affected parties should be able to bring citizen
suits requiring compliance with the conservation easement terms.
Once again, the difference between conservation easement ac-
tions and other permit enforcement actions is that the action
would not necessarily be against the permit holder. There are
three possible defendants here. The action could be brought
against the exacted conservation easement holder for not up-
holding his end of the bargain, against the landowner for violat-
ing the easement terms, or against the DOI for failing to ensure
compliance with the ESA. Claims against the landowner for vio-
lating the easements and the easement holder for turning a blind
eye to the violation could be brought by individuals or groups
acting as private attorneys general under the ESA's citizen suit
provision. Actions against the DOI could be brought under the
ESA's citizen suit provision or the APA.
Under the ESA, any person may sue any other person, includ-
ing a governmental entity, alleged to be in violation of any ESA
provision or implementing regulation.224 Citizen suits may not
224 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2004).
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be brought unless the plaintiff provided appropriate prior no-
tice.225 Claims are further barred if the Secretary of the Interior
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action against
the violator.226 To bring an ESA citizen suit, a plaintiff must
show standing to bring the action.227 Although the statutory pro-
visions appear to grant broad standing to all persons, plaintiffs
must still satisfy constitutional standing requirements born out of
Article III's case or controversy requirement.
Establishing standing with regards to environmental laws, and
the ESA in particular, is not so easy these days. There are three
main elements needed for Article III standing: (1) an injury in
fact, which is both concrete and particularized, and either actual
or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.228 These requirements
could prove difficult to meet for individuals or organizations that
desire to enforce a conservation easement. In Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, the Supreme Court declined to honor Congress's
expansive view of standing, nearly invalidating the citizen suit
provision of the ESA. The Court also rejected several novel ap-
proaches to standing advanced by the plaintiffs.2 29 It is not clear
how far standing can be asserted in the wake of this case. The
"injury in fact" prong will limit who can bring such a suit. Neigh-
boring landowners may be able to bring suits based on scenic
values, noise, or other side effects of easement violations.
Groups could try to bring a suit based on the theory that injury
to biodiversity is an injury to the public, but courts have held that
the injury must go beyond injury felt by the public at large.230
Even if the causal connection between the injury and the con-
duct complained of is relatively clear, redressability may be diffi-
cult to show. If the easement has been fully violated and the
parcel developed, a plaintiff would need to show that there is still
a way to restore the habitat and that the animal has not been
irreparably injured. If the species has gone extinct, it will be im-
possible to show redressability.
225 Id. § 1540(g)(2).
226 Id.
227 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
228 Id. at 559-60.
229 Id. at 565-66 (rejecting standing arguments based on an ecosystem nexus, an
animal nexus, and a vocational nexus).230 ld. at 560 n.1.
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The Ninth Circuit has held that citizens may sue to enjoin an
imminent threat of harm. In Rosboro Lumber, the court ruled
that a citizen suit was actionable because the plaintiff demon-
strated that the proposed logging was reasonably certain to in-
jure endangered owls.23 ' If an intended violation is discovered
before irreparable harm occurs, an action will have a greater
likelihood of progressing.
Citizen suits may also be filed to compel the Secretary of the
Interior to take specified emergency actions232 or to perform
non-discretionary statutory duties. 233 However, the Court has
limited the types of claims that can be brought under the ESA
citizen suit provision. In Bennett, the Court indicated that the
duties covered by the citizen suit provision relate exclusively to
compliance with section 4, concerning species listing and critical
habitat designation, and do not include agency obligations under
section 7.234 With this limitation, it is unclear whether citizen
suits can be brought based on sections 9 or 10. Although no
court has addressed whether a citizen suit can be brought based
on section 10, the Fifth Circuit extended the jurisdiction of such
suits, ruling that a citizen suit was available to redress an alleged
violation of the affirmative conservation duty imposed on federal
agencies by section 7(a)(1).235
ii. APA
Even when groups and individuals are unable to avail them-
selves of the citizen suit provision of the ESA, they may still pur-
231 Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th
Cir. 1995). The court indicated in dictum, however, that a mere threat of harm is not
grounds for imposition of civil or criminal penalties. Id. at 786 n.3.
232 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(B).
233 Id. § 1540(g)(1)(C).
234 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172 (1997). Nor is an alleged violation of sec-
tion 7 the appropriate basis for a citizen suit under section 11(g)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(1)(A). Id. at 174. Litigants nevertheless may challenge the government's
failure to comply with section 7 duties under the APA. Id. at 179.
235 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1); see also Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 617
(5th Cir. 1998). For a discussion of the affirmative conservation duty, see GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
§ 15C:18 (2004). Cf Am. Canoe Ass'n v. EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 927 (E.D. Va.
1998) (holding jurisdiction was appropriate under the ESA's citizen suit provision,
not the APA, for claims that EPA failed to comply with section 7 consultation re-
quirements when it reviewed the state's implementation of a water quality standards
program under the Clean Water Act).
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sue a cause of action under the APA.23 6 A person or entity
suffering a legal wrong because of a federal administrative
agency's action, or who is adversely affected or aggrieved by an
agency's action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is enti-
tled to judicial review under the APA.23 7
If an exacted conservation easement is held by a state level
government agency, state statutes could provide for specific en-
forcement or review mechanisms as described above. When the
government entity is federal, plaintiffs may also bring suits under
the APA. The APA grants standing to a person "aggrieved by
[an] agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. 2 38
A person's interest under the APA, the Supreme Court stated,
may reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational," as well
as economic values. 239 The Supreme Court, in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, stated in dictum that it had no doubt that
"recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment" are among the inter-
ests that the "land withdrawal review program" of the Bureau of
Land Management was specifically designed to protect.24 °
When plaintiffs bring claims based on the APA, they must sat-
isfy the zone of interests test laid out in ADAPSO.241 Plaintiffs
must show that their grievances "arguably fall within the zone of
interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision[s] or
constitutional guarantee[s] invoked in the suit. '2 42 The plaintiff
must make it clear that the she is within the zone of interests to
be protected by the particular provision involved, not the statute
as a whole.2 4 3 The test is a prudential standing requirement of
236 Glickman, 156 F.3d at 618; see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber
Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001).
237 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2003).
238 Id.
239 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO), 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970).
240 497 U.S. 871, 886 (1990) (As to the "zone of interests" test, the Court stated
that recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment were among the interests to be pro-
tected under the statute in question. As to whether there was an injury to these
interests, the Court noted that the affidavits indicated only that the members used
unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory of some 5.5 million acres and
did not necessarily indicate that they used the 4,500 acres on which the Bureau in-
tended to allow mining activities.).
241 ADAPSO, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970).
242 Bennett v. Spear 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); see also ADAPSO, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) (first use of zone of interests test by the Supreme Court).
243 ROGER FINDLEY & DANIEL FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW NUTSHELL 3
(2000); Donald T. Kramer, "Zone Of Interests" Tests in Determining Standing in
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general application, the Court explained, that applies unless ex-
pressly negated by Congress. 244 The Court also stated that by
providing that "any person may commence a civil suit," the citi-
zen suit provision of the ESA negates the "zone of interests" test
by allowing "any person" to commence such a suit as opposed to
only those persons with a protected interest. 45 In cases where
the plaintiff is not the subject of the contested regulatory action,
the zone of interests test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the pur-
poses implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that Congress intended to permit the suit. The zone of interests
test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there
does not need to be any indication of congressional purpose to
benefit the would-be plaintiff.246
b. State Enforcement Routes
If federal routes of enforcement do not prove fruitful, there
are multiple opportunities to attempt to enforce exacted conser-
vation easements based on state laws.24 7 This method may be
especially pertinent where parties are unable to meet the strin-
gent standing requirements of federal courts and the ESA.
States often have broader standing allowances.
i. Based on State Conservation Easement Statutes
States create their own conservation easement framework by
statute.48 Although these statutes vary, many of them are based
on the UCEA described in Section I. A state may choose to de-
scribe enforcement provisions specifically in its conservation
easement act, including allowing for third party enforcement.
Section 1 of the UCEA details a third party right of enforce-
ment, which it defines as "a right provided in a conservation
easement to enforce any of its terms granted to a governmental
Litigation Involving Federal Statutes-Supreme Court Cases, 153 A.L.R. FED. 375
(1999).
244 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163.
245 Id. at 164.
246 Id. at 175-76.
247 This section describes pursuit of enforcement under state law based on the
assumption that the exacted conservation easements in question satisfy the state
conservation easement statutes. See supra note 212. If there is a conflict with the
state conservation easement statutes, there are still potential avenues of enforce-
ment based on state common law, but they are not discussed here.
248 Every state but Wyoming has done so.
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body, charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable
trust, which, although eligible to be a holder, is not a holder" of
the conservation easement in question. 49
Section 3 of the UCEA recognizes four types of eligible en-
forcers: "(1) an owner of an interest in the real property bur-
dened by the easement; (2) a holder of the easement; (3) a
person having a third-party right of enforcement [of the conser-
vation easement]; or (4) a person authorized by other law. 250
The first three categories describe parties delineated specifically
in the easement agreement. The fourth category, however, is a
bit wider and vaguer. Generally, an example of "a person au-
thorized by other law" is a state attorney general. 1
States that have adopted the UCEA are the most likely to
identify rights of third-party enforcement. 2  States not adopting
the UCEA tend not to even include mention of third-party bene-
ficiaries-neither describing them nor prohibiting them. 253
Even with provisions allowing for third-party beneficiaries,
groups may have trouble bringing actions. In New York, the
state conservation easement statute only allows for third-party
enforcement by groups specifically mentioned in the terms of the
conservation easement agreement.254 Connecticut, which has
conservation easement legislation that predates the UCEA, does
not have a clear articulation of third-party enforcement rights. In
Burgess v. Breakell, a Connecticut Superior Court did not allow
a neighbor to bring an action against an easement violator, hold-
ing that the state's conservation easement statute limits the right
to bring an enforcement action against the easement holder.255
In Massachusetts, where the conservation easement statute is
similar to Connecticut's, the Supreme Judicial Court did recog-
nize the right of some public officials and charitable organiza-
tions to enforce "certain easements in gross. 256
249 Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(3), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981).
2 50 Id. § 3(12).
251 Rob Levin & Jessica Jay, Memorandum of Law: Legal Roundtable on Third-
Party Standing, presented at the LTA Rally (Oct. 2003).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See Friends of the Shawanagunks, Inc. v. Knowlton, 476 N.E.2d 988, 991 n.4
(N.Y. 1985).
255 Burgess v. Breakell, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 610, No. CV 95 0068033, 1995 WL
476782, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct., 1995) (unpublished opinion).
256 Bennett v. Comm'r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Mass. 1991).
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Because of the uncertainty surrounding enforcement rights
under state conservation easement statutes, state enforcement is
not a secure route to guarantee protection of endangered species
and their habitat. Every state statute has a different structure,
and even when the statutes are similar, the courts of different
states may interpret them in conflicting ways. Generally, how-
ever, statutes providing for some type of third-party enforcement
open the door to securing better compliance with conservation
easements and HCPs.
ii. Based on State Charitable Organization Statutes
As discussed earlier, state attorneys general may have the abil-
ity to enforce conservation easements when they are held by
charitable organizations. In most states, the attorney general has
the power to oversee public charities as part of her duty to re-
present the public. Because the Services require conservation
easements created in conjunction with HCPs to be held by either
government agencies or charitable organizations, an attorney
general should have the right to enforce many of these conserva-
tion easements. State conservation easement statutes vary as to
whether they specifically detail the rights of the attorney general.
In Friends of Shawanagunks, the New York case mentioned
above, the state statute discussed had originally included a right
of enforcement by the New York Attorney General, but a later
amendment removed it.257 Nevertheless, the court upheld the
right of the Attorney General to enforce based on his overall
authority over public charities."'
In some states, the attorney general plays an integral role in
the drafting, monitoring, and enforcement of conservation ease-
ments. In Maryland, for example, the state conservation ease-
ment statute is silent on the role of the Attorney General; yet,
there are assistant attorneys general whose major responsibilities
are drafting and enforcing conservation easements. 9
iii. Based on State Administrative Procedure Acts
States often have their own version of the federal APA. These
statutes could be invoked to enforce exacted conservation ease-
ments held by state agencies. Additionally, some state conserva-
257 Shawanagunks, 476 N.E.2d at 991 n.4.
258 Id.
259 Levin & Jay, supra note 251, at 8-9.
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tion easement statutes specifically detail administrative
procedures for and review of state agencies that hold conserva-
tion easements. 26
0
iv. Based on State Public Trust Responsibilities
The public trust doctrine is rooted in traditions of Roman and
English law.2 61 Originating out of public values of navigation
and fishing, the early articulation of the doctrine protected navi-
gable waters, the lands beneath them, and shores and tide-
lands.2 62 These resources are held by the state in trust for the
people of the state. More recently, states have begun to expand
their notion of public trust to encompass other lands and natural
resources.
2 63
The public trust doctrine is a matter of state law, and state
courts range from clear rejection of the doctrine in any form to
wide expansion of the doctrine to cover many types of lands, wa-
ters, and resources. Because of this wide variation from state to
state, it is unclear how useful the doctrine can be in seeking en-
forcement of conservation easements. Because the public trust
involves state ownership, this would only implicate easements
that are held by state and local government agencies. For an en-
forcement action to be brought under the public trust doctrine, a
state would have to view the conservation easement as a natural
resource that should be protected on behalf of its people. The
state of New Hampshire has recognized such an interest-specif-
ically acknowledging that conservation easements purchased
through one particular state-funded program are to be held in
public trust by the state.2 64
D. A Way to Address Enforcement Concerns
The cleanest way to address enforcement concerns is to make
sure that there are multiple routes of enforcement. Currently,
the holders of an exacted conservation easement are usually the
only ones who can enforce the easement. It is important to de-
260 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
261 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).
262 JOSEPH SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 529 (2000).
263 Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democritization of Western Water
Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 573, 599-600
(1989).26 4 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 486-A:13 (2000).
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velop a second route of enforcement in case an easement holder
cannot, or chooses not to, enforce an easement. The next key
question is: who else should have the right of enforcement? Be-
cause everyone has an interest in biodiversity and forwarding the
goals of the ESA, there is a strong argument that private citizens
and organizations should be able to bring enforcement actions
either through an ESA citizen suit action or under the APA.
However, the most straightforward solution may be to create
third-party enforcer status for federal government agencies.
The most straightforward way to incorporate more enforce-
ment routes would be to establish the DOI as having a third
party right of enforcement. The DOI has already begun to get
itself included in conservation easements as an enforcer. This
method makes sense because it is the federal government that
ultimately holds the responsibility for enforcing the ESA. This
procedure should be codified in regulations to ensure that ex-
acted conservation easements have some level of uniformity in
enforcement routes. Private citizens could then bring violations
to the attention of the DOI, which could then enforce the ex-
acted conservation easement. If the DOI shows itself to be an
ineffective enforcer, citizens should be able to bring APA suits
against the DOI requiring the Department to do its job and fol-
low its own regulations.
While this solution may seem simple, there is no precedent for
including third-party enforcers or beneficiaries in traditional
easements. Indeed, it goes against the very notion of easements,
which represent private rights and agreements between parties.
Expanding the number of enforcers or beneficiaries could create
a public right in millions of acres of private land. This change
would likely need to come by statute, because there is no analo-
gous system in the common law.
CONCLUSION
One key to protecting threatened species is to find incentives
for people to protect them. Aldo Leopold argued that species
generally become threatened because it is in no one's self-inter-
est to manage for them.265 Threatened and endangered species
are generally not overtly commercial species -- they are not
265 See ALDO LEOPOLD, THREATENED SPECIES (1936), reprinted in THE RIVER
OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS 231 (Susan L. Fader & J. Baird
Callicot eds., 1991).
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hunted or traded. Although some of the most famous endan-
gered species are sought out by birdwatchers and wildlife enthu-
siasts, the vast majority of listed species are not well known. This
is why government agencies and conservationists are looking for
new tools to protect habitat. Conservation easements can pro-
vide the incentive for private landowners to protect endangered
species habitat on their land. But what happens when we are not
talking about voluntary conservation easements? These exacted
conservation easements are not incentive-based; rather, they are
coercive. Conservation easements are touted as a new and excit-
ing flexible land preservation tool, but this is only when discuss-
ing conservation easements that are undertaken more willingly-
not when developers are coerced to purchase or create conserva-
tion easements to meet other goals they have.
The ESA has only been "minimally successful" at preserving
species and their habitat.266 It is difficult to really measure the
success of the program for several reasons. What should be the
indicator of success? The delisting of a species? Perhaps the in-
creased listing of species represents the fact that the law is work-
ing well to bring more areas under protection. But if the goal of
the law is to improve species numbers and protect their habitat,
things do not look good for the ESA. Some species have recov-
ered and there is anecdotal evidence that the program is a suc-
cess-just look at the reintroduction of the grey wolf or the
recovery of bald eagle populations. However, seven previously
listed species have been declared extinct by the FWS.267 Addi-
tionally, some scholars argue that many species have gone extinct
while waiting to be listed.268 Estimates on the number of these
species vary from thirty-four to three hundred.269 Professor Jac-
queline Lesley Brown argues that the success of the ESA should
be measured by looking at the number of recovered species, the
number of downlisted species, and the number of species pro-
gressing toward recovery. ° When Professor Brown examined
this data, she concluded that the ESA merely slows, but does not
266 Brown, supra note 105, at 169.
267 United States Fish & Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species
System (TESS), Delisted Species Report (2005), at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/
TESSWebpageDelisted?listings=0 (last updated Jan. 19, 2005).
268 Brown, supra note 105, at 170.
269 Id.
2 70 Id. at 171.
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stop the extinction of species.271 Clearly current practices must
be strengthened to meet ESA goals.
Conservation easements can be valuable land conservation
tools because they allow private citizens to take an active role in
protecting lands. However, in the end, it is unclear whether
these conservation easements actually help meet the goals of the
ESA. In general, they prohibit harmful activities, but because
conservation easements encumber private land, there are no ac-
tive management or recovery plan requirements associated with
conservation easements. As Michael Bean of Environmental
Defense has pointed out, "it is insufficient simply to prohibit
harmful activities. ' 272 Conservation easements exacted under
the ESA are becoming increasingly sophisticated; as both conser-
vation easements and HCPs age. The players are learning more
about how to make the agreements more successful. The next
step in the process is to make sure that these agreements will be
enforced.
271 Id. at 177.
272 Michael J. Bean, Overcoming Unintended Consequences of Endangered Spe-
cies Regulation, 38 IDAHO L. REv. 409, 414 (2002).
